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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is taken from a final Judgment dated 
September 14, 1995 and an earlier Order dated February 18, 1994 of 
the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of 
Utah. This case was assigned to the Court of Appeals. The Utah 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(k) (1995 Supp.). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in 
dismissing Images' claim for fraudulent inducement on the basis of 
res judicata (R. 284-86; 732, 1017, 1251). A trial court's grant 
of a motion for summary judgment is a matter of law which is 
reviewed for correctness. White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P. 2d 1371, 
1374 (Utah 1994) (citing Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 
1037, 1039 (Utah 1991); Hunsaker v. State, 870 P.2d 893, 896 (Utah 
1993)). 
II. Whether the trial court erroneously found that 
Michael Macris' activities in supplying nail gels directly to 
Images distributors and in commencing the organization of a 
competing company to Images, while President and the sole employee 
of Macris & Associates, were not attributable to Macris as an agent 
or representative of Macris & Associates, and whether the trial 
court erroneously concluded that Macris & Associates was not the 
alter ego of Michael Macris (R. 290-92, 4668-85, 4749-74, 4845-80, 
4977-5094, 5526-83, 5611-12, 5614-21, 5626-27). A trial court's 
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findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard 
while the court's conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. 
U.R.C.P. 52(a) (1995); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State 
Lands, 886 P.2d 514, 519 (Utah 1994) (clearly erroneous standard); 
Pasker# Gould, Ames & Weaver, Inc. v. Morse, 887 P.2d 872, 875 
(Utah App. 1994) (conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness); 
Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990). 
III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by 
refusing to allow Images to call William Crismon, a witness listed 
on both Plaintiff's and Defendant's witness list in Images' case in 
chief (R. 2611, 4921-40). This Court reviews a trial court's 
decision to exclude a witness under an abuse of discretion 
standard. "Excluding a witness from testifying is, however, 
'extreme in nature and . . . should be employed only with caution 
and restraint.'" Barrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R., 830 P.2d 
291, 293 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Plonkev v. Superior, 475 P.2d 
492, 494 (Ariz. 1970). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
The determinative statutes, rules and constitutional pro-
visions are set forth in the addendum where not set forth fully in 
the body of this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Complaint in this action was filed by Macris & 
Associates on April 17, 1991 alleging, among other claims, breach 
of an Addendum to Distributor Application ("Addendum"), and breach 
of the Distributor Application (the "Distributorship Agreement") 
(R. 8) . Macris & Associates filed a Second Amended Complaint on 
the 9th of June, 1992 which likewise included claims for breach of 
the Addendum and breach of the Distributorship Agreement (R. 169) . 
Images filed an Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party 
Complaint on the 17th of June, 1991 (R. 52) and thereafter an 
Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint on the 9 th of 
September, 1992 against Macris & Associates and Michael Macris 
which included among other claims that Macris & Associates breached 
the agreements with Images; Macris & Associates was the alter ego 
of Michael Macris; and Michael Macris fraudulently induced Images 
into entering into the agreement with Macris & Associates (R. 293) . 
Prior to trial, Macris & Associates filed a motion for 
summary judgment seeking dismissal of the fraudulent inducement 
claim supported by: (i) Macris & Associates, Inc.'s and Mike 
Macris' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
Against Images & Attitude, Inc. and Thomas Mower Re: Fraudulent 
Inducement, Interference with Contractual and Economic Relations, 
Defamation and Breach of Contract (R. 661); and (ii) Macris & 
Associates, Inc's and Mike Macris' Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Their Motion For Summary Judgment for Images' Breach of Contract, 
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and in Support of their Motions for Summary Judgment Re: Alter 
Ego, Fraudulent Inducement, Interference with contractual and 
Economic Relations, Defamation and Breach of Contract (R. 811) . 
Images opposed the motion for summary judgment as set forth in its 
(i) Memorandum in Opposition to Macris & Associates, Inc.'s Motion 
for Summary Judgment against Images & Attitude, Inc., For Breach of 
Contract and in Opposition to Macris & Associates, Inc's and Mike 
Macris' Motion for Summary Judgment Against Images & Attitude, Inc. 
and Thomas Mower Re: Alter Ego, Fraudulent Inducement, Interference 
with Contractual and Economic Relations, Defamation, and Breach of 
Contract (R. 1017); and its Memorandum in Support of Defendants' 
Motion to Strike and in Opposition to Supplemental Memorandum in 
Support of Macris & Associates, Inc.'s and Mike Macris' Motion for 
Summary Judgment Re: Fraudulent Inducement (R. 1206). 
After oral argument had been held on the matter, Macris 
& Associates filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Macris 
& Associates, Inc.'s and Mike Macris' Motion for Summary Judgment 
Re: Fraudulent Inducement asserting that the claim was barred by 
the principles of res judicata on the basis that the arbitrator in 
the matter of Eclat, Inc. f/k/a Images v. Affinity, Inc., Consoli-
dated Arbitration Case Nos. 81-81002693 and 81-181006092, in ruling 
on a motion for summary judgment, held that Images was not 
fraudulently induced into a contract with Affinity (R. 1191) . In 
its supplemental memorandum, Macris & Associates reasoned that 
since the misrepresentations Images relied on in entering into the 
Addendum with Macris & Associates were essentially the same as the 
APPEAL.BRF (AN/MACRIS) 4 
misrepresentations which were the basis for Images' fraudulent 
misrepresentation claim against Affinity, Images' claim against 
Macris & Associates was res judicata notwithstanding the fact that 
the two different suits involved two separate contracts with two 
separate entities (Affinity and Macris & Associates) (R. 1180-
1191). The trial court accepted Macris & Associates' reasoning, 
and on the 18th of February, 1994, entered an order dismissing 
Images' fraudulent inducement claim (R. 1251). 
The remaining claims between Macris & Associates, Michael 
Macris, and Images came on for trial on February 16, 17, 21, 22, 
24, and 27, and March 27, 1995. At trial, the court refused to 
allow Images to call a material witness in its case in chief, 
namely William Crismon, who was listed on both Images' and Macris 
& Associates' witness lists (R. 4932, 4940). The court made its 
determination based upon the fact that William Crismon was not 
listed in Images' responses to interrogatories submitted prior to 
the discovery cut-off date even though (i) Macris & Associates was 
on notice of the witness and the matters to which he would testify, 
(ii) William Crismon was already listed on Macris & Associates' 
witness list, and (iii) he was listed on Images' witness list 
submitted to the court over a month prior to the trial (R. 4921-
40) . 
After the trial, the trial court entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law on the 14th of September, 1995 (R. 
3060). Among the trial court's findings, the court found: Macris 
& Associates was active in promoting Images and Images products 
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from August 1989 through March 1991 (R. 3056); Macris & Associates 
fulfilled its responsibilities under the contract with Images (R. 
3052); Images wrongfully terminated the Addendum with Macris & 
Associates (R. 3051); and Macris' activities in forming a competing 
company were not imputed to Macris & Associates (R. 3048). From 
the Findings of Fact, the trial court entered its Conclusions of 
Law which included: Macris & Associates performed according to all 
conditions of the contract between the parties (R. 3046); Images 
materially breached the contract between the parties when it 
suspended Macris & Associates' autoqualification (R. 3047); Images 
materially breached the contract between the parties when it ceased 
paying Macris & Associates (R. 3047); Macris & Associates is not 
the alter ego of Michael Macris, nor is Michael Macris the alter 
ego of Macris & Associates (R. 3046); and Macris & Associates did 
not materially breach the contract with Images (R. 3046). 
The trial court then entered its Judgment against Images 
on the 14th of September, 1995 (R. 3064) . It is from this Judgment 
as well as the partial summary judgment order entered on the 18th 
of February, 1994 that Images appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS 
In 19 89, Michael Macris ("Macris") was the President of 
two companies: Affinity Inc. ("Affinity"), a nail system manufac-
turing company of which Macris was the sole shareholder, director 
and employee; and Macris & Associates, Inc. ("Macris & Associ-
ates"), a marketing company of which Macris and his wife, Valerie 
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Macris, were the only directors and shareholders at that time and 
Macris was the only employee (R. 4668-69, 4842, 4859, 4861). In 
the spring of 1989, Macris approached Images & Attitude, Inc. 
("Images11)- -a multi-level marketing company which markets health 
and beauty products--through its President, Thomas Mower ("Mower"), 
concerning the possibility of Images marketing a nail care system 
manufactured by Affinity. Macris also represented to Mower that 
Macris was interested in participating in Images as a distributor 
of Images products. (R. 5154-55). 
In the course of negotiating contracts between Affinity 
and Images, and between Macris & Associates and Images, and as an 
inducement to Images to enter into the contracts, Macris repre-
sented to Mower that Macris had obtained a state of the art nail 
gel which had been developed by a Dr. Lyman, who was a scientist 
with the University of Utah (R. 1047, 5176) . In reliance upon this 
false representation and other misrepresentations by Macris, Images 
entered into a contract with Affinity in June of 1989 for the 
purchase of nail gels and lamp housings to be used in the assembly 
by Images of a nail care kit (R. 1046-47). 
On or about the 7th of August, 1989, Macris applied for 
an Images Distributorship under the name, Macris & Associates (R. 
4669) . In the course of negotiating a distributorship for Macris, 
Macris indicated he had approximately two million dollars worth of 
advertising for the nail kits already in place, and he offered a 
proposal to Mower whereby the National Enquirer would run a full 
story on the nail care system which included nail gel developed by 
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Dr. Lyman and Macris would sign up the prospective distributors. 
In exchange, Images would automatically qualify Maoris' distribu-
torship to the level of Presidential--meaning that Images would pay 
bonuses to Macris as if his distributorship had reached the 
Presidential level even though it had not (R. 793-96). 
Macris also represented that he had several "big-hitters" 
in multi-level marketing, including Hayden and Joanne Cameron and 
Margie Hunsaker, who would also be willing to sign up as distribu-
tors, if they could be "autoqualified" at the Presidential level as 
well (R. 5160-63) . Macris suggested that by autoqualifying the 
three distributors at the Executive level, they would be free to 
pursue the thousands of leads that would come from the National 
Enquirer ad without the distractions of meeting monthly sales 
requirements (R. 5162). 
In reliance upon the representations of Macris, Images 
agreed to enter into an Addendum to Distributor Application 
("Addendum") whereby Macris & Associates would be "autoqualified" 
at the Executive level as long as Macris & Associates was "active 
in promoting Images and Images products." (R. 794, 5176, Trial 
Exhibit 1) . The stated objective of the Addendum was for Macris & 
Associates to ultimately "develop each distributorship according to 
the width projects of the Images marketing plan." (Trial Exhibit 
2) . The Images marketing plan required a distributor to have 
twelve front-line qualified executive distributors in order to 
qualify at the Presidential level (R. 4675). Two identical Addenda 
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were negotiated by Macris and entered into by Images with the 
Camerons and Margie Hunsaker (Trial Exhibits 3 and 4). 
At approximately the time Images entered into Addendum 
agreements with Macris & Associates, the Camerons, and Hunsaker, 
Macris signed the Cameron distributorship directly frontline to 
Macris & Associates, and the Hunsaker distributorship was signed up 
under the Cameron distributorship (R. 5098, Trial Exhibit 3) . From 
the time the Macris & Associates Addendum was executed until Images 
terminated Macris & Associates autoqualification status, Macris & 
Associates had not signed up a single distributorship frontline to 
Macris & Associates other than the MacGregor and Cameron distribu-
torships in August of 1989 (R. 4912, 5212). 
In approximately the summer of 199 0, Images distributors 
began experiencing irritation as a result of the nail gel (R. 
5223) . During this period, Hayden Cameron discovered that Dr. 
Lyman was not in fact the developer of the nail gel sold to Images 
by Affinity. At that point, Hayden Cameron refused to run an ad to 
market the nail care product through the National Enquirer or any 
other national magazines. (R. 5104-06). 
In approximately the fall of 199 0 and while Macris was 
the President and sole employee of Macris & Associates, Macris 
began providing other Images distributors with sample nail gels for 
testing purposes, which gels later became the primary product for 
a newly organized and competing company (R. 4681, 4683, 4774, 
4845). Images repeatedly instructed Macris that he should cease 
testing gels on Images distributors and that such conduct consti-
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tuted a breach of Images policies and procedures (R. 5051, Trial 
Exhibits 12, 39, 55). Not later than February of 1991 and while 
President and sole employee of Macris & Associates, Macris began 
his efforts to form a multilevel marketing company to market nail 
care systems in direct competition with Images (R. 5611) . This 
company was eventually called Emily Star, Inc. d/b/a Emily Rose (R. 
4752, 5110). 
On or about the 7th of March, 1991, Images terminated 
Macris & Associates' autoqualification status for failure to remain 
active in building the Macris & Associates distributorship (Trial 
Exhibit 8, R. 4684). Thereafter, Images terminated the entire 
Macris & Associates distributorship for inactivity, for gel 
testing, and for competitive activities. Macris & Associates 
responded by commencing this action (R. 8). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellant Images asserts that the trial court committed 
reversible error in no less than three instances in this litiga-
tion. First, the trial court erred when it granted Macris & 
Associates' Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of res 
judicata. Next, the trial court erroneously found that the acts of 
Michael Macris were not attributable to Macris & Associates and 
that Macris & Associates was not the alter ego of Michael Macris. 
Finally, the trial court erred at trial when it excluded a witness 
from testifying in Images' case in chief. 
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Regarding Images' first assignment of error, Images 
asserts that the collateral estoppel branch of the doctrine of res 
judicata did not apply to bar Images' fraudulent inducement claim 
against Macris & Associates. The issue actually considered in the 
prior arbitration proceeding was whether Michael Macris' misrepre-
sentations regarding the role of Dr. Lyman in developing Macris' 
nail gel induced Images into entering into a contract with 
Affinity. The issues presented in this case were whether Michael 
Macris' misrepresentations regarding the role of Dr. Lyman and his 
misrepresentations regarding advertising and Macris' ability to 
bring in "big-hitters" induced Images into entering into a contract 
with Macris & Associates. The issues were not identical. Nor was 
Images afforded an opportunity for competent, full, and fair 
litigation of the issues in the earlier arbitration proceedings.1 
Accordingly, collateral estoppel did not apply and the trial court 
erred in entering summary judgment against Images on that basis. 
Images' second assignment of error relates to the trial 
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law which erroneously 
found and concluded that Michael Macris was not acting as an agent 
for Macris & Associates when he engaged in disruptive, competitive 
and inappropriate behavior, that the acts of Macris were not 
attributable to Macris & Associates, and that Macris & Associates 
was not the alter ego of Michael Macris. The marshaled evidence 
including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are insuffi-
1Actually, the arbiter improperly made factual determinations on the Motion 
for Summary Judgment (R. 1195-98). 
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cient to support the trial court's findings. Instead, the evidence 
overwhelmingly supports Images' assertions that the acts of Macris 
are attributable to Macris & Associates, or alternatively, that 
Macris & Associates is the alter ego of Michael Macris. Addition-
ally, to the extent that the trial court's conclusions of law are 
based upon its erroneous findings of fact, they too are incorrect. 
Had the trial court correctly concluded that the disruptive, 
improper, and competitive activities of Michael Macris are 
attributable to Macris 6c Associates, or alternatively that Macris 
& Associates was the alter ego of Michael Macris, it would have 
necessarily concluded that Macris & Associates first breached the 
agreement with Images by engaging in such disruptive, improper, and 
competitive conduct. Accordingly, Images has been prejudiced by 
the trial court's erroneous findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. 
Concerning Images' final assignment of error, the trial 
court abused its discretion when it excluded William Crismon from 
testifying at the trial of this matter. William Crismon was added 
to Images' final witness list which was submitted to the Court and 
to opposing counsel over one month in advance of trial. Mr. 
Crismon was already listed on Macris & Associates' witness list and 
had been deposed by Images three and one-half months prior to 
trial. There was no judicially imposed deadline for submitting 
witness lists in this case. On the contrary, the trial court had 
earlier entered an order based upon the parties' stipulation 
specifically stating that the parties' witness lists could be 
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supplemented. The law is Utah is clear. It is an abuse of 
discretion for a trial court to exclude a witness from testifying 
at trial when no deadline for designating witnesses was imposed by 
the trial court. 
The numerous errors of the trial court in this case 
mandate that its Judgment be overturned and remanded to the trial 
court for a new trial on the issues contained in Images' Counter-
claim and Third-Party Complaint and Images' affirmative defenses 
against Macris & Associates' Complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
Images asserts that the trial court committed at least 
three errors which were substantial, prejudicial, and adversely 
effected the outcome of trial; namely, that (i) the trial court 
erred in granting Macris & Associates' motion for summary judgment 
on the issue of fraudulent inducement; (ii) the trial court erred 
in concluding that Macris' competitive and improper acts were not 
attributable to Macris & Associates, or alternatively, that Macris 
& Associates was not the alter ego of Michael Macris; and (iii) the 
trial court erroneously excluded relevant testimony of certain 
witnesses at trial. Based upon these errors, the Judgment should 
be reversed as a matter of law, or the case should be remanded for 
a new trial on these issues. 
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I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DISMISSING 
IMAGES' CLAIM FOR FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT ON THE BASIS OF 
RES JUDICATA. 
The trial court entered summary judgment on Defendant's 
fraudulent inducement claim based upon the doctrine of res 
judicata. "Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue 
of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 293 
Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (Utah App. 1996); Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
857 P.2d 263, 265 (Utah App. 1993). Since summary judgments are 
decided as questions of law, this Court should "accord no deference 
to the trial court's determinations and review the issues under a 
correctness standard." Id. Furthermore, where this review 
involves a summary judgment, this Court should "view the facts and 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party." De Baritault v. Salt Lake City 
Corp. 913 P.2d 743, 744 (Utah 1996) (quoting Hicrcrins v. Salt Lake 
County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993)); Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 
132, 133 (Utah 1992) . 
Images' Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint 
alleged a cause of action against Macris & Associates and Mike 
Macris ("Macris") for fraudulent inducement based upon several 
statements made by Macris to Images' President, Thomas Mower 
("Mower"). These statements included the following: (i) that 
Macris had developed a nail gel and nail preparation for a 
fingernail bonding system with Dr. Donald Lyman of the University 
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of Utah; and (ii) that Macris had advertising already in place to 
promote the fingernail bonding system, which advertising was worth 
approximately 2.5 million dollars (R. 285, 795) .2 
Macris & Associates filed several motions for summary 
judgment in August of 1993 including a motion requesting summary 
judgment on Images' fraudulent inducement claim (R. 732) . In 
support of its motion, Macris & Associates argued that neither 
Macris & Associates nor Mike Macris made the alleged misrepresenta-
tions, and even if they have made the misrepresentations, Images 
did not reasonably rely upon them in entering into the Addendum 
Agreement with Macris & Associates (R. 716-22). In opposition to 
Macris & Associates' motion and as supported by the Affidavit of 
Tom Mower (R. 790-97), Images established that genuine issues of 
material fact existed relative to whether Mike Macris made the 
alleged misrepresentations and whether Images relied upon the 
alleged misrepresentations (R. 1001-17; 1043-48). 
After oral argument on the matter, Macris & Associates 
filed a supplemental memorandum in support of its motion for 
summary judgment. Macris & Associates informed the court of 
arbitration proceedings between Images and Affinity (the nail gel 
company solely owned and operated by Mike Macris). (R. 1191). 
In the Affinity proceedings, Images had also asserted a 
fraudulent inducement claim against Affinity. Affinity informed 
2Images' Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint contained a 
typographical error. Images claimed that Macris represented $2,000,000 to 
$2,500,000 in advertising, not $250,000 as set forth in the Amended Counterclaim 
and Third-Party Complaint. See Mower Affidavit at R. 794. 
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the court that the Arbiter in the Affinity action ruled that 
"Affinity made no misrepresentations of material facts to [Images] 
to induce [Images] to enter into the Agreement and [Images] , in any 
event, did not reasonably rely on the alleged misrepresentations." 
(R. 1189) . Macris & Associates then urged the court to "assert the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel to prevent Images from relitigating 
the issue of fraudulent inducement insofar as that issue is based 
on the allegations concerning Dr. Lyman and his role in developing 
the gel products sold under the Affinity Agreement." (R. 1188). 
After consideration of Macris & Associates' supplemental 
memorandum, the trial court ruled that the issue as to whether Mike 
Macris had fraudulently induced Images had been fully and fairly 
litigated in the prior arbitration proceeding and that the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel barred Images from asserting a fraudulent 
inducement claim against Macris & Associates and Mike Macris (R. 
1233). Thereafter, the trial court granted Macris & Associates' 
motion for summary judgment relating to Images' claim for fraudu-
lent inducement based upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel (R. 
1250-51) . 
Collateral estoppel bars a party from relitigating an 
issue previously litigated where (1) the issue in the subsequent 
action is identical to the issue decided in the previous action; 
(2) the issue was decided in a final judgment on the merits; (3) 
the issue was competently, fully, and fairly litigated in the first 
action; and (4) the party against whom the doctrine was applied was 
a party to the first action. Sew v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 
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629, 632 (Utah 1995); Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Utah 
1993) rev'd on other grounds, 297 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Aug. 13, 1996); 
Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 248 (Utah App. 1987). 
The trial court's ruling was erroneous in many respects. 
First, the Affinity arbitration dealt with whether Images had been 
fraudulently induced into entering into the Affinity contract, not 
the Macris & Associates Addendum and Distributorship Agreement. 
Second, the issue of whether Images had been fraudulently induced 
into entering into the Macris & Associates Addendum was never 
addressed in the Affinity arbitration. Third, since the Affinity 
arbitration matter was decided on a motion for summary judgment, no 
full and fair litigation occurred of Images' fraudulent inducement 
claim. Finally, the issue of whether Macris misrepresented that he 
had advertising and "big-hitters" already in place was never 
addressed in the Affinity arbitration and likewise was apparently 
not considered by the trial court in granting Macris & Associates' 
motion for summary judgment. 
A. Collateral Estoppel Does Not Bar Images From Claiming 
Fraudulent Inducement Regarding the Macris & Associates Addendum. 
The first element of collateral estoppel requires that 
the issues in the subsequent action be identical to the issues in 
the former action. Timm, 851 P.2d at 1184. In the Affinity 
arbitration, Images specifically alleged that Mike Macris made 
material misrepresentations regarding the role of one Dr. Lyman, a 
scientist then employed at the University of Utah, in developing 
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the nail gel supplied by Mike Macris and to be used in the nail 
care kit. Images further alleged that Macris' representations were 
false, were intended to induce Images into entering into a contract 
with Affinity, and that Images did rely upon Macris' representa-
tions. (R. 1190) . 
The fact that Images has relied in part upon the same 
misrepresentation concerning Dr. Lyman for a separate contract does 
not create identical issues. In the Arbitration action, the issue 
was whether Images was fraudulently induced by virtue of the 
misrepresentation into entering into the Affinity contract in June 
of 1989 (R. 4669). In the instant case, however, the issue to be 
litigated was whether Images was fraudulently induced into entering 
the Macris & Associates Addendum and Distributorship Agreement in 
approximately August of 19 89 (R. 4669). 
Unfortunately, the Arbiter's ruling in the Arbitration is 
not sufficiently detailed to assist in the determination of whether 
identical issues were involved. The Arbiter specifically ruled: 
Affinity made no misrepresentations of material facts to 
[Images] to induce [Images] to enter into the [Affinity] 
Agreement and [Images] , in any event, did not reasonably 
rely on the alleged misrepresentations. 
(R. 1197) . In fashioning this ruling, the Arbiter failed to 
specify whether it was his finding that either (i) Macris made no 
representations; (ii) the representations of Macris were not false; 
(iii) the representations of Macris were not material; (iv) or 
precisely which alleged representations the Arbiter based his 
decision upon. 
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Clearly Macris & Associates presented no evidence to the 
trial court to demonstrate that the issues involved in the 
arbitration were identical to the issues presented in this 
litigation. Accordingly, the trial court erred in determining that 
the first element of the doctrine of collateral estoppel had been 
met. 
Similarly, there was no evidence presented to the trial 
court to suggest that the issue of whether Images relied upon the 
representations concerning Dr. Lyman's role in entering into the 
Macris & Associates Addendum agreement was even considered in the 
arbitration proceedings. Macris & Associates was not a party to 
the arbitration proceedings; nor was the Macris & Associates 
Addendum or Distributorship Agreement at issue in the arbitration 
proceedings. (R. 1195-98). Clearly, the trial court erred in 
determining that the issues contained in the arbitration proceed-
ings and in the instant litigation were identical. 
B. Summary Judgment in a Prior Arbitration Proceeding Does 
Not Constitute Full and Fair Litigation. 
Images asserts that since Images' fraudulent inducement 
claims were decided on Affinity's motion for summary judgment in 
the Arbitration proceedings, Images was not afforded a competent, 
full and fair litigation of Images' claims. Accordingly, the third 
element of the doctrine of collateral estoppel was not satisfied. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that where a case 
is decided on a motion for summary judgment, it is possible that no 
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full and adequate evidentiary hearing was held. Rocky Mtn. Thrift 
Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989) . In 
Rocky, the Utah Supreme Court stated, "Inasmuch as this case was 
decided in the trial court on a motion for summary judgment, no 
full and adequate evidentiary hearing was held to resolve critical 
facts." Id. at 464. 
Likewise, Images was not afforded a full and adequate 
evidentiary hearing on its fraudulent inducement claims. Moreover, 
in the Affinity arbitration, the Arbiter overstepped his bounds by 
deciding very factually intensive and material issues at the 
summary judgment stage. Images should not be barred from litigat-
ing in the present action the question of whether Mike Macris or 
Macris & Associates fraudulently induced Images into entering into 
the Addendum and Distributorship Agreement where the earlier 
arbitration proceedings determined genuine issues of material fact 
at the summary judgment stage relative to a separate agreement with 
a separate entity. Images was not afforded competent, full and 
fair litigation of the issue of whether Macris' representations 
regarding Dr. Lyman fraudulently induced Images into entering into 
the Addendum and Distributorship Agreement with Macris & Associ-
ates. Accordingly, the third element of the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel was not met and the trial court erred in applying the 
doctrine to Images' peril. 
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C. The Former Arbitration Proceeding Did Not Address Macris' 
Representation Regarding Advertising. 
As mentioned, Images' Amended Counterclaim and Third 
Party Complaint alleged that Mike Macris represented--at the time 
he negotiated the Addendum and Distributorship Agreement--that he 
and Macris & Associates already had advertising in place worth 
approximately two million dollars to promote the nail care product 
(R. 285). This alleged fraudulent misrepresentation was not 
addressed in the arbitration proceedings, nor was it even refer-
enced in Macris & Associates' Supplemental Memorandum in Support of 
Macris & Associates, Inc.'s and Mike Macris' Motion for Summary 
Judgment Re: Fraudulent Inducement (R. 1191) or in Macris & 
Associates' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' [Images] Motion 
to Strike Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment Re: Fraudulent Inducement (R. 1225) . 
Moreover, nothing in the arbitration order suggests that 
the alleged misrepresentation regarding advertising was even 
considered during arbitration. Clearly, the requirements of 
collateral estoppel were not met. The issue of whether Macris 
materially misrepresented his advertising capability and his 
ability to bring in "big-hitters" was never arbitrated. Therefore, 
the issues litigated in the arbitration proceeding were not 
identical to those raised by Images in this action, neither was 
there a competent, full and fair litigation of the advertising 
issue in the arbitration proceeding. Timm, 851 P. 2d at 1184. 
Accordingly, the trial court clearly erred in granting Macris & 
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Associates' motion for summary judgment on Images' fraudulent 
inducement claim on the basis of collateral estoppel. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT THE COMPETITIVE ACTIVI-
TIES OF MICHAEL MACRIS WERE NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO MACRIS & 
ASSOCIATES CONSTITUTE CLEAR ERROR. 
The evidence presented at trial did not support the trial 
court's findings and conclusions that the competitive activities of 
Michael Macris were not attributable to Macris & Associates either 
because Michael Macris was the agent of Macris & Associates and 
acted within the scope of his employment or because Macris & 
Associates was not the alter ego of Michael Macris. Indeed, the 
evidence marshalled on appeal does not support the trial court's 
findings and conclusions. Instead, the evidence overwhelmingly 
supports Images' position that (i) Michael Macris was an agent of 
Macris & Associates when he engaged in competitive and disruptive 
activities; (ii) Macris & Associates is the alter ego of Michael 
Macris; and (iii) Macris' competitive and disruptive conduct is 
attributable to Macris & Associates. 
A. Images Specifically Challenges Twelve of the Trial 
Court's Findings of Fact. 
Images challenges the trial court's findings of fact 
which found that Michael Macris' competitive activities were not 
performed as an agent or representative of Macris & Associates. 
Specifically, Images challenges the following twelve findings: 
21. In the attempt to develop or locate a suitable nail 
gel, Macris, on behalf of Affinity, Inc. ("Affinity")--a 
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company in which Macris was involved but which was separate 
and d i s t i n c t from Pla in t i f f [Macris & Associates] and had i t s 
own contrac tual r e l a t ionsh ip with Defendant [Images] as a 
suppl ier--had individuals sample various gels to determine 
whether they could use the gels without i r r i t a t i o n and to 
determine whether other c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the gels were 
appropr ia te . 3 
22. Affini ty, Inc. provided gel samples to Hunsaker, who 
had t r i e d various gel samples for Affini ty even before 
becoming a d i s t r i b u t o r for Defendant. Affini ty a lso provided 
various gel samples to Ms. Reynolds, who had become sens i t i zed 
to Defendant's ge l . Affinity also provided gel samples to 
Defendant to allow Defendant's personnel and various d i s t r i b u -
tors to t ry the samples.4 
23. In a l e t t e r dated August 31, 1990, addressed to 
"Mike Macris Aff in i ty ," Mower, on behalf of Defendant noted 
tha t Affini ty had provided new gels to d i s t r i b u t o r s to t e s t 
before Defendant had seen the new ge l s . Mower explained tha t 
he had not seen Af f in i ty ' s new gel but had heard about i t from 
d i s t r i b u t o r s . Mower requested that Affini ty not supply any 
gels to Defendant's d i s t r i b u t o r s to sample unless Defendant 
was a lso given the ge l s . 5 
24. Following the August 31, 1990 l e t t e r , Macris, on 
behalf of Affini ty, always provided defendant with any new gel 
before any d i s t r i b u t o r sampled the ge l . 
25. Defendant also began t e s t ing i t s own new gels on i t s 
d i s t r i b u t o r s , including on Hunsaker and Ms. Reynolds--the two 
d i s t r i b u t o r s who t r i e d Af f in i ty ' s new g e l s . Hunsaker reported 
to Mower her impressions of any new gel she t r i e d for Affini-
ty . Mower never ins t ruc ted her not to t e s t or sample Affini-
t y ' s g e l s . 
26. P la in t i f f never tes ted or otherwise provided gels to 
any of Defendant's d i s t r i b u t o r s . 
3Images does not d i s p u t e t h a t Macris provided ge l s to Images' d i s t r i b u t o r s 
or t h a t he d id so on behalf of A f f i n i t y . Rather , Images a s s e r t s t h a t h i s a c t i o n s 
a re a l s o a t t r i b u t a b l e to Macris & Assoc i a t e s , of which he was the s o l e 
shareho lder and employee. 
4Images does not d i spu t e t h a t Macris suppl ied ge l s to Reynolds and 
Hunsaker, but r a t h e r t h a t Macris was an agent for both A f f i n i t y and Macris & 
Assoc ia t e s when he supp l ied ge l s to Reynolds and Hunsaker. 
5Images contends t h a t the l e t t e r was addressed to Macris a t A f f i n i t y and 
t h a t Mower r eques ted t h a t Macris , not merely A f f i n i t y , not supply g e l s to Images 
d i s t r i b u t o r s . 
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40. Defendant warned Plaintiff in March 1991, after 
already terminating Plaintiff's autoqualification status, not 
to supply gels to Defendant's distributors, or it may be 
grounds for terminating Plaintiff. Plaintiff never tested or 
otherwise provided gels to Defendant's distributors. 
41. In a letter dated March 29, 1991, after already 
terminating Plaintiff's autoqualification status and failing 
to pay Plaintiff for the month of February 1991, Defendant 
gave Plaintiff "formal" notice that it was considering 
termination of its distributorship. The reasons given were 
testing gels after warnings not to do so, lack of activity 
under the Addendum, and damaging activity against Defendant 
and its distributor force. The evidence did not support the 
stated reasons for termination, all of which were without 
merit. Plaintiff had not engaged in conduct which violated 
Plaintiff's [sic] policies and procedures or the contract. 
51. There was not adequate or credible evidence to 
establish that Plaintiff breached its contract with Defendant. 
52. Macris' activities on behalf of the new company 
Emily Rose were not done either as an agent or representative 
for the Plaintiff. Plaintiff never had any contractual 
relationship with Emily Rose.6 
57. There was not adequate or credible evidence to 
establish that Macris & Associates, Inc. is the alter ego of 
Michael Macris, or that Michael Macris is the alter ego of 
Macris & Associates, Inc. There was ample evidence that 
adequate corporate formalities were met and that each main-
tained their separate legal personalities. 
58. There was not adequate or credible evidence to 
establish that observance of the corporate distinction between 
plaintiff and Macris sanctioned a fraud, promoted an injustice 
or resulted in an inequity. 
(R. 3047-60) 
6Images agrees that Macris conducted activities on behalf of Emily Rose, 
but disputes the trial court's finding that he was not an agent or representative 
of Macris & Associates when he conducted those activities. 
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There is no factual dispute (i) that Michael Macris 
supplied gels to Images distributors for sampling and testing (R. 
4681, 4773, 4845-46); (ii) that Images sent Macris a letter dated 
August 31, 1990 requesting Macris to stop supplying gels to Images 
distributors for sampling (Trial Exhibit 55) ; or (iii) that Macris 
created a new company, Emily Rose (R. 5611; Trial Exhibits 93, 94) . 
Images contends that all of these competitive actions were done by 
Michael Macris himself, and that since he was the sole shareholder 
and employee of Macris & Associates, these actions were attribut-
able to Macris & Associates thereby constituting a breach of its 
agreement with Images. 
B. The Evidence Marshalled On Appeal Is Insufficient to 
Support the Trial Court's Findings. 
Images recognizes its burden on appeal. "To show clear 
error, the appellant must marshal all of the evidence in support of 
the trial court's finding and then demonstrate that the evidence, 
including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insuffi-
cient to support the findings against an attack." State v. 
Higcrinbotham, 917 P.2d 545 (Utah 1996); State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 
474, 475-76 (Utah 1990); Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 
467, 470 (Utah 1989). While at first appearance, such marshaling 
seems an arduous task, a review of the trial record indicates that 
the evidence supporting the trial court's findings of fact consists 
mainly of the self-serving testimony of Michael Macris. 
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Michael Macris testified that he personally supplied gels 
to Images distributors for testing purposes, however, Macris & 
Associates did not test gels on anyone (R. 4681, 4845) . Macris 
also testified that Affinity gave nail gels to Images distributors 
(R. 4682, 4851). Macris further testified that American Polymer 
also gave gels to distributors (R. 4683, 4856). American Polymer 
was another gel manufacturing company controlled and operated by 
Michael Macris (R. 4853-55). Significantly, American Polymer had 
no contract to supply gels to Images. Thus, Macris, the sole 
employee of Macris & Associates, was supplying the nail gel of a 
competing company, American Polymer, to Images distributors and 
later to Emily Rose. 
With respect to the other competitive actions of Macris, 
namely, forming a competing multi-level marketing company, again 
the only testimony supporting the trial court's findings consist of 
the self-serving testimony of Michael Macris. Macris claimed that 
(i) Macris & Associates never presented other opportunities to any 
Images distributors (R. 4685); (ii) Macris was actually attempting 
to recruit an individual by the name of David Floor into Images in 
February 1991, not into Macris' new competing company (R. 4823); 
(iii) Macris did not resign from Macris & Associates on March 12, 
1991 in order to create his competing company, Emily Rose (R. 
5503); and (iv) Macris did not begin to organize Emily Rose until 
the middle to end of March, 1991 (R. 5547-48). 
All of this evidence, taken together, is insufficient to 
support the trial court's findings. Moosman, 794 P.2d at 475-76. 
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Maoris' self-serving testimony fails to demonstrate that his 
disruptive gel testing and competitive activities in creating Emily 
Rose were not also committed while Macris was acting as an agent 
for Macris & Associates. 
The record is replete with evidence to support a finding 
that even though Macris may have been acting on behalf of Affinity, 
American Polymer or Emily Rose when engaging in disruptive and 
competitive activities, he was also the sole agent and representa-
tive of Macris & Associates. The distributors only dealt with 
Michael Macris. (R. 4732, 4734, 4749, 4774, 5591, 5614). Macris 
did not distinguish on whose behalf or in which capacity he was 
acting when he engaged in the disruptive or competitive activities. 
For instance, the record shows that Glen Tillotson never 
understood the difference between Macris and Macris & Associates. 
Tillotson dealt with Michael Macris and then later found out it was 
Macris & Associates.7 (R. 4732, 4734). Tillotson also believed 
that Affinity was a company that Macris was affiliated with (R. 
4733) . 
Margie Aliprandi8 also testified concerning her knowledge 
of the relationship between Michael Macris and his various 
companies. Aliprandi testified that she understood that Michael 
Macris supplied the nail gels to Images (R. 4749) . At some point, 
7Mr. Tillotson's testimony is significant because he was a witness for 
Macris & Associates and he worked closely with Michael Macris in developing the 
Hunsaker downline from the beginning. 
8Margie Aliprandi was formerly known as Margie Hunsaker. The names 
Aliprandi and Hunsaker have been used interchangeably throughout the record. 
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Maoris explained that the gels were supplied through his company, 
but initially she did not understand that to be the case. To 
Aliprandi, Macris was doing it all. Aliprandi even told other 
Images distributors that Michael Macris supplied the nail gel. (R. 
4749) . Furthermore, when Macris gave nail gels to Aliprandi to 
sample, Aliprandi understood that they were coming from Macris. 
She did not know on behalf of which entity Macris was acting (R. 
4774) . 
Similarly, Kathrine Duffy, an Images distributor to whom 
Macris had supplied gels for testing purposes, knew that Macris was 
in Margie Aliprandi's upline, but had never heard of Macris & 
Associates (R. 5591) . Jim Tate met Macris several months after 
becoming an Images distributor. Tate was also an Images distribu-
tor to whom Macris supplied nail gels for testing purposes. Tate 
had learned in early 1991 that Michael Macris was no longer 
supplying gels to Images (significantly, Tate referred to Macris 
and not to Affinity). Tate had never heard of Macris & Associates 
(R. 5594) . 
Likewise, Randall Johnston, who met Michael Macris in the 
summer of 1989, understood that Michael Macris was Margie Ali-
prandi's sponsor, believed that Macris was in Johnston's upline in 
Images, and had never heard of Macris & Associates (R. 5596) . 
Finally, Janiell Reynolds--yet another Images distributor to whom 
Macris supplied gels for testing purposes--testified that she knew 
Michael Macris was in her Images upline. Although Reynolds had a 
lot of dealings with Macris, she did not really know what Macris & 
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Associates was and had felt that Affinity was a predecessor to 
Images. (R. 5614-15, 5618). 
With regard to Macris' other competitive activities, 
individuals contacted by Macris knew that Macris was an Images 
distributor, not that he was merely an employee of the corporate 
distributor Macris & Associates and that he was not acting as an 
agent for Macris & Associates when he attempted to negotiate 
contracts for competing business. Susan Franceschi met Macris in 
December of 1990 when Macris was attempting to negotiate a contract 
for American Polymer to supply nail gel to Lume, the company by 
which Franceschi was employed. Macris represented that he, not 
Macris & Associates, was an Images distributor and intimated that 
women in his downline who liked the nail gel Macris proposed to 
supply to Lume might become Lume distributors instead. (R. 5625-
27) . 
With respect to Macris' new company, Emily Rose, David 
Floor, an initial investor in Emily Rose, testified that Macris 
approached him in January or February of 1991 to raise money for 
Macris' new company.9 Floor knew Macris because Macris had 
approached him one year earlier about the prospect of becoming an 
Images distributor. (R. 5611). 
While Macris was engaging in disruptive and competitive 
activities, he was the sole shareholder, officer, director, agent 
q0f course, Macris claims he did not contact Floor until the middle to end 
of March, 1991. However, the proformas prepared by Macris for Emily Rose appear 
to be dated March 1, 1991 which is more consistent with the unbiased testimony 
of Floor. (Trial Exhibits 93, 94). 
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and employee of Affinity, a company manufacturing nail gel for use 
in a home nail care kit (R. 4669, 4842-43). Macris also created 
another nail gel manufacturing company, American Polymer in 
approximately November of 1990 (R. 4683, 4853). Macris was a 
director, officer, shareholder and employee of American Polymer. 
Macris also began creating Emily Rose in January or February of 
1991 (R. 5611) to market the nail gel manufactured by his company, 
American Polymer. During these activities, Macris was also an 
officer, director, and the sole shareholder and employee of Macris 
& Associates (R. 4861, 5052). 
Macris' responsibilities for all these companies was to 
market nail gel and related products. On behalf of all of these 
companies, Macris contacted individuals, including Images distribu-
tors, who did not recognize Macris' different principles. Even so, 
Macris' position at trial was that he was acting on behalf of 
American Polymer and Emily Rose, not Macris & Associates, when he 
was attempting to negotiate contracts for the competing business. 
However, Macris' position ignores the consequences of his acts as 
a dual or multiple agent. Even if Macris was acting on behalf of 
American Polymer and Emily Rose, he was still doing it while he was 
the sole employee, agent and shareholder of Macris & Associates. 
Clearly, the evidence presented before the trial court 
and marshaled here, including all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, does not support the trial court's findings and 
conclusions. Instead, the evidence overwhelmingly supports the 
finding that Macris was the agent of Macris & Associates and that 
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Maoris & Associates was the alter ego of Michael Macris as well as 
the conclusion that the competitive and disruptive activities of 
Michael Macris are attributable to Macris & Associates. 
C. The Trial Court's Conclusions of Law, To the Extent Based 
Upon A Tacit Finding That Macris Was Not An Agent for Macris & 
Associates, Are Incorrect. 
The trial court's erroneous findings led the trial court 
to erroneously conclude that the acts of Michael Macris, as an 
agent of Macris & Associates, were not attributable to Macris & 
Associates. Images specifically disputes the following conclusions 
of law: 
7. Plaintiff performed according to all of the condi-
tions of its contract with Defendant until Defendant wrongful-
ly breached the contract, and Plaintiff did not materially 
breach the contract. Therefore, Defendant's Second Cause of 
Action, based on breach of contract, is without merit or legal 
basis and shall be dismissed with prejudice. 
(R. 3046) . 
Implicit in this Conclusion is a finding that at a 
minimum, Macris was not an agent of Macris & Associates when he 
engaged in the disruptive and competitive activities which 
constitute a breach of the Distributorship Agreement and the Images 
Policies and Procedures (Trial Exhibits 1, 78) . In its conclusion, 
the trial court appeared to ignore fundamental principles of agency 
law. 
"It is well established in the law that a principal is 
liable for the acts of his agent within the scope of the agent's 
authority, irrespective of whether the principal is disclosed or 
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undisclosed.11 Garland v. Fleischmann, 831 P.2d 107, 110 (Utah 
1992). Moreover " [t]he fact that an agent acts in his own name 
without disclosing his principal does not preclude liability." 
Id. ; 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 320 (1986) . A central focus in any 
agency question is whether the employee was acting in the scope of 
his employment with the principle at the time of the alleged wrong. 
Moreover, "[t]he question of whether an employee is acting within 
the scope of his employment at a particular time is normally a 
question for the fact finder unless there is only one reasonable 
conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence." Lane V. Messer, 
731 P.2d 488, 490 (Utah 1986). 
In order for the actions of Macris to be considered 
within the scope of his employment with Macris & Associates, 
Macris' conduct must "(1) 'be of the general kind the employee is 
employed to perform'; (2) 'occur within the hours of the employee's 
work and the ordinary spatial boundaries of the employment'; and 
(3) 'be motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving the 
employer's interest.'" Jackson v. Righter, 891 P.2d 1387, 1391 
(Utah 1995) (quoting Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 
1056 (Utah 1989)). 
The evidence presented at trial unquestionably set forth 
that Macris was the employee of Macris & Associates and was acting 
within the scope of his employment with Macris & Associates when he 
engaged in disruptive and competitive activities. Macris & Associ-
ates had a contract with Images to market Images and Images' 
products (Trial Exhibits 1, 2) . Macris' duties with respect to 
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marketing Images and Images' products--specifically Images' nail 
gel and care product which was the only product Macris ever 
marketed on behalf of Images--included working directly with other 
Images distributors, attending distributor meetings, and meeting 
with the public for the purpose of promoting Images to members of 
the public (R. 4685-91). 
At the same time Macris was supposedly promoting Images' 
nail care product, including the nail gel, on behalf of Macris & 
Associates, he was testing nail gels on Images distributors for the 
benefit of his companies Affinity and American Polymer and was also 
creating a new marketing company, Emily Rose, to market American 
Polymer's gel. All of this evidence points to one inescapable 
conclusion: Macris was directing the activities of four companies 
owned and controlled by Macris, without distinguishing which 
activities were attributable to which company. Thus, when Macris 
dealt with Images distributors and marketed a nail care product, he 
was acting in the scope of his employment with Macris & Associates. 
Likewise, when Macris engaged in the disruptive and competitive 
activities on behalf of his other companies for the purpose of 
marketing a nail care product, he was also acting in the scope of 
his employment with Macris & Associates. As a matter of law, 
Macris was acting as the agent of Macris & Associates when he 
engaged in the activity which Images alleged constituted a breach 
of the Addendum Agreement. Consequently, Macris' competitive 
activities are imputed to Macris & Associates. 
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The irony of the trial court's findings and conclusions 
underscores the trial court's errors. On one hand, the trial court 
determined that the conduct of and the statements made by Michael 
Macris, on behalf of Affinity, were also attributable to Macris & 
Associates for purposes of collateral estoppel. (See Section I). 
However, for purposes of Images' affirmative defenses, Counterclaim 
and Third Party Complaint, the conduct of and the statements made 
by Michael Macris were attributable only to the entity he ascribed 
them to during his self-serving testimony. No other witness was 
able to segregate his conduct; so, how could the trial court? The 
current result is fundamentally unjust and inequitable and dictates 
that this Court overturn the trial court's judgment with respect to 
Images' affirmative defenses to Macris & Associates' Complaint and 
Images' Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint. 
D. The Trial Court's Conclusion That Macris & Associates Is 
Not The Alter Ego of Macris Is Erroneous. 
Images also asserts that the evidence presented at trial 
overwhelmingly supports a conclusion that Macris & Associate was in 
fact the alter ego of Michael Macris, its controlling shareholder, 
and constituted a facade used to promote fraud and injustice by 
Macris. 
Macris' position at trial--apparently adopted by the 
trial court--ignored the principle of alter ego. Clearly, the 
evidence presented at trial overwhelmingly supports a conclusion 
that Macris & Associates has no separate identity or existence 
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apart from Michael Maoris. Notwithstanding the compelling 
evidence, the trial court concluded: 
6. Plaintiff [Macris & Associates] is not the alter ego 
of Third-Party Defendant [Macris] the alter ego of Plaintiff. 
Each maintained their separate legal personalities and the 
observance of the corporate distinction between Plaintiff and 
Third-Party Defendant would not sanction a fraud, promote an 
injustice or result in an inequity. Therefore Defendant's 
First Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party 
Defendant, based on alter ego, is without merit or legal basis 
and shall be dismissed with prejudice. 
(R. 3046) . 
Utah courts will pierce the corporate veil of a corpora-
tion and hold a shareholder personally liable if 
two circumstances [are] present: ' (1) Such a unity of inter-
est and ownership that the separate personalities of the 
corporation and the individual no longer exist, but the 
corporation is, instead, the alter ego of one or a few 
individuals; and (2) if observed, the corporate form would 
sanction a fraud, promote injustice or result in an inequi-
ty . '" 
Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 499 (Utah App. 1994) 
(citing Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah App. 1987). 
While not an exhaustive list, factors Utah courts consider in 
determining whether to pierce the corporate veil include: 
(1) undercapitalization of a one man corporation; (2) failure 
to observe corporate formalities; (3) nonpayment of dividends; 
(4) siphoning of corporate funds by the dominant shareholders; 
(5) nonfunctioning of the other officers or directors; (6) 
absence of corporate records; (7) the use of the corporation 
as a facade for operations of the dominant stockholder or 
stockholders; and (8) the use of the corporate entity in 
promoting injustice or fraud. 
Colman, 743 P.2d at 786. 
At trial, the evidence overwhelmingly preponderated the 
fact that Macris used his corporate entities as a facade for the 
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operations of Macris to promote injustice and fraud. Other 
evidence presented at trial also supported Images' alter ego claim. 
Such evidence included the fact that Michael Macris was 
never certain about which office he held at Macris & Associates at 
a particular time. Macris often represented himself as President 
of Macris & Associates when he was actually the Secretary, and vice 
versa (R. 5531, 5540) . Macris represented on 1989 tax returns that 
he was the sole shareholder in Macris & Associates even though his 
wife, Valerie Macris, testified that his shares had been trans-
ferred to her in 1987 (R. 5534-36) . Macris & Associates funds were 
used to pay for Affinity's legal fees (R. 5539). Macris and his 
wife were the only employees of Macris & Associates (R. 5040) . 
Additionally, Valerie Macris acknowledged that corporate formali-
ties were not always met at Macris & Associates (R. 5125) . 
Essentially the only evidence presented by Macris to 
counter Images' alter ego claim was Macris' testimony and that of 
his wife, Valerie Macris, that Macris & Associates was incorporated 
in November of 1985 (Trial Exhibit 72), Macris & Associates held 
board of directors' meetings and Macris & Associates appointed 
officers (R. 4864-69) . 
The evidence presented at trial overwhelmingly estab-
lished that (i) Macris & Associates failed to observe many 
corporate formalities; (ii) Valerie Macris' role within Macris & 
Associates was minimal at best--for the most part Macris & 
Associates was controlled by Michael Macris; (iii) many corporate 
records for Macris & Associates were absent; (iv) Macris & 
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Associates was used as facade for the operation of its dominant 
stockholder, Michael Macris; and (v) the use of the corporate 
entity promoted injustice or fraud by allowing Macris to reap the 
rewards of the marketing efforts of distributors in Macris & 
Associates' downline while shielding Macris from the consequences 
of his disruptive and competitive activities while an agent for 
Macris & Associates. Surely, Macris & Associates was the alter ego 
of Michael Macris. 
The trial court erred in finding that Macris & Associates 
was not the alter ego of Michael Macris, that the actions of Macris 
are not attributable to Macris & Associates, and that Macris & 
Associates did not breach the contract by engaging in disruptive 
and competitive activities. Accordingly, the conclusions of law 
based upon these erroneous findings are incorrect. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN REFUSING TO 
ALLOW IMAGES TO CALL WILLIAM CRISMON, A WITNESS LISTED ON 
BOTH PLAINTIFF'S AND DEFENDANT'S WITNESS LIST. 
Over one month in advance of the trial of this matter, 
Images filed Defendant Images' Supplemental Response to Plaintiff's 
Third Set of Interrogatories to Defendant10 (herein "Images' 
Supplemental Response") wherein Images essentially supplemented its 
witness list to include among other individuals, one William 
Crismon (R. 2337-40). Macris & Associates thereafter filed a 
10Defendant Images's Supplemental Response to Plaintiff's Third Set of 
Interrogatories to Defendant was filed in the Fourth District Court on January 
13, 1995. 
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Motion to Exclude Witnesses seeking to exclude as witnesses for 
Images all of the newly added individuals including William Crismon 
(R. 2609-11). Macris & Associates argued essentially that since 
Images did not disclose the additional witnesses prior to the 
discovery cutoff date of December 1, 1994, Images should be 
precluded from calling those additional individuals as witnesses at 
trial (R. 2676-82) . 
In opposition to Macris & Associates' Motion to Exclude 
Witnesses, Images asserted that (i) William Crismon was already 
listed on Macris & Associates' witness list; (ii) there was a 
stipulation and order in place allowing the parties to supplement 
their witness list; (iii) there was no court imposed deadline for 
designating witnesses; and (iv) Images' witness list was submitted 
over one month in advance of trial (R. 2716-25). The trial court 
heard oral arguments on the motion on the third day of trial and 
ruled that the additional witnesses would be excluded with the 
exception of David Floor.11 (R. 4940) . 
A. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Excluding 
William Crismon From Testifying. 
"Excluding a witness from testifying is . . . 'extreme in 
nature and . . . should be employed only with caution and re-
straint.'11 Barrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R., 830 P.2d 291, 293 
nThe trial court made the exception for Mr. Floor since Mr. Floor's 
deposition was taken on the December 1, 1994 discovery cutoff date, which 
deposition clearly disclosed Macris' involvement with William Crismon regarding 
the competitive activities. (R. 4938). 
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(Utah App. 1992) (citations omitted) . The trial court abused its 
discretion by excluding William Crismon from testifying in Images' 
case in chief. In Barrett, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the 
trial court's exclusion of a witness who had been designated only 
four days before trial, holding that "absent an order creating a 
judicially imposed deadline, a trial court may not sanction a party 
by excluding its witnesses under rule 37(b) (2) . " 830 P. 2d 291, 296 
(Utah App. 1992). 
In the instant case, there was no judicially imposed 
deadline for designating witnesses. In fact, the trial court had 
issued an Order allowing the subsequent supplementation of either 
parties' witness list (R. 1462). Where there was no judicially 
imposed deadline for designating witnesses, it constituted an abuse 
of discretion for the trial court to excluded a witness who had 
been designated over a month in advance of trial and who was listed 
on the opposing parties' witness list. 
B. Macris & Associates Would Not Have Been Prejudiced Had 
William Crismon Been Allowed To Testify. 
Clearly, Macris & Associates would not have suffered 
prejudice had William Crismon been allowed to testify. Images 
stipulated at trial that William Crismon would testify only 
concerning matters which were discussed at Crismon's deposition 
taken on October 20, 1994 and at which counsel for Macris & 
Associates were in attendance. (R. 4935). Moreover, William 
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Crismon was listed on Macris & Associates' own witness list. (R. 
4932). 
Images, rather, was prejudiced by the exclusion of 
William Crismon in its case in chief. The Utah Court of Appeals 
addressed the matter of prejudice to the parties in Barrett, 
stating: 
Some indication of the importance of the error with which 
we are here concerned is to be found in the fact that counsel 
thought the matter of sufficient consequence that he objected 
to [the admission of the evidence] . If it is so plain that it 
would not have helped plaintiff's case, one is led to wonder 
why counsel made the objection and insisted that it not be 
used. The obvious answer seems to be that defendant's counsel 
was actually apprehensive that it may have a substantial 
effect against his client. Of course, he could not be sure, 
nor can we. 
830 P.2d at 297. Likewise, Macris & Associates obviously was 
apprehensive about that the testimony of William Crismon--as set 
forth in his deposition--might have a substantial effect against 
Macris & Associates. The deposition testimony of William Crismon 
significantly supported Images' breach of contract claim as 
contained in Images' Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Com-
plaint. It was prejudicial to Images to exclude William Crismon. 
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in excluding 
William Crismon's testimony at trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the Order and Judgment entered by 
the Third District Court and remand the case to the Third District 
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Court for a new trial on the issues of fraudulent inducement, 
breach of contract and alter ego as asserted in Images' affirmative 
defenses contained in Images' Amended Counterclaim. 
DATED this zcr dajy—oiL September, 1 
j&n***3 
S K. POOLE 
ANDREA NUFFER 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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this day of September, 
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ADDENDUM 
ffi^'i-^ct Court o. 
l Way 
. CARMA 3. SA-JTH, Cark 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
frVKs 
Deputv 
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., a Utah 




CASE NO. 910400358 
(Judge Guy R. Burningham) 
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501 on Defendants' Motion to 
Strike Macris & Associates, Lie's and Mike Macris's Supplemental Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment Re Fraudulent Inducement, and on Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment Re Defendants' Claim of Fraudulent Inducement. The Court has 
reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of counsel, oral argument having been heard, 
and upon being advised in the premises, now makes the following: 
RULING 
1. The Court finds that Defendants' Motion to Strike Macris & Associates, Inc.'s 
and Mike Macris's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
Re Fraudulent Inducement ("Motion to Strike") would result in keeping relevant information 
from this Court that is dispositive of issues before this Court. 
2. The Court therefore denies Defendants' Motion to Strike. 
A - l 1 OO/f 
3. The Court further finds that the prior judgment against the Defendants on the issue 
of whether Mr. Macris, whether acting as an agent for Macris & Associates, Inc. or 
Affinity, Inc., fraudulently induced Images & Attitude, Inc. need not be re-litigated in this 
action. This is based upon the following: 
a) Collateral estoppel applies to issues decided on summary judgment; 
b) Collateral estoppel applies to issues decided in arbitration proceedings; 
c) The issue as to whether Mr. Macris fraudulently induced the Defendants has 
already been fully and fairly litigated in a prior arbitration proceeding; and 
d) The prior arbitration proceeding found that no fraudulent inducement had 
occurred. 
4. The Court therefore grants Plaintiff Macris & Associates, Inc.'s and Third-Party 
Defendant Mike Macris* Motion for Summary Judgment Re Defendants* Claim of Fraudulent 
Inducement. 
Counsel for Plaintiff is to prepare an order consistent with the terms of this ruling and 
submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for 
signature. 
Ruling Page -2-
Dated this _/_ day of February, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: Jon V. Harper, Esq. 
Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq. 
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DENNIS K. POOLE (2625) 
ANDREA NUFFER (6623) 
DENNIS K. POOLE AND ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Defendants 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
(801) 263-3344 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and THOMAS MOWER, an 
individual, 
Defendants, 
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., 





Civil No. 910400358 
Judge: Guy R. Burningham 
Plaintiff, Defendants, and Third-Party Defendants, by and 
through their respective counsel, hereby stipulate and agree as 
follows: 
MALRIS iTP (EC) 
1. That the discovery cut off in this matter shall be 
extended through December 1, 1994. 
2. That Defendants Images & Attitude, Inc. and Thomas Mower 
shall provide the Plaintiff with an up-dated witness list not later 
than September 16, 1994, which witness list may be supplemented 
thereafter. 
3. That the Plaintiff withdraws its Motion in Limine, 
without prejudice. 
4. That the parties respectfully request the Court to adopt 
the stipulations set forth herei 
9 V-
DATED this ' day of September, 1^94. 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs 
THOMAS R. KARRENBERG 
ANDERSON 5 KARRENBERG 
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DENNIS K. POOLE (2625) 
ANDREA NUFFER (6623) 
DENNIS K. POOLE AND ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Defendants 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 




IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and THOMAS MOWER, an 
individual, 
Defendants, 
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., 





Civil No. 910400358 
Judge: Guy R. Burningham 
Based upon the Stipulation of the parties hereto, and for good 
cause appearing, it is hereby 
ORDERED as follows: 
MAORIS.OHD IEC) 
A-6 
' J ^ 1462 
1. That the discovery cut off in this matter be and is 
hereby extended through December 1, 1994. 
2. That Defendants Images & Attitude, Inc. and Thomas Mower 
shall provide the Plaintiff with an up-dated witness list on or 
before September 16, 1994, which witness list may thereafter be 
supplemented. 
3. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine be and is hereby withdrawn, 
without prejudice. 
ORDER DATED this day of September, 1994, 
BY THE COURT: 
THOMAS R. KARRENBERG 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Third-Party Defendants 
?~ 9- ?</ 
I ^ COURT JUDG 
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DENNIS K. POOLE (2625) 
ANDREA NUFFER (6623) 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Defendants 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-3344 
i in in 1 1 in i i nv r'onRTH iTUDTfTAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, I N C . , 
F i a i n ^ - i L f 
s 
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., 
a Utah corporation, and 
THOMAS MOWER, an individual. 
Defendants . 
IMAGES & i \ T'Tl I I Ji: I: 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
- v s •• 
MIKE MACRIS, 
ThIrd•Party Def endan; 
D E F E N D A N T I M A G E S # S 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S THIRD SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES TO DEFENDANT 
CA SE I IC 9J 0400358 
JUDGE GUY R. BURNINGHAM 
DEFENDANT IMAGES rnrr-uqr. :* a-:c:neys( hereby 
supplements its resrr^ .r.r to Fxaiiiiiii' s Inird Set 01 Interrogate -




INTERROGATORY NO ,_ JL 5 ; Ident ify a I ] persons whom you intend to 
c a 11 a s a w i t n a s s a t th e 11: i a ] :: f 11 :i :i s i i: i.a 1 1 a i: 
ANSWER: 
Defendant Images i ntends to cal] the following individuals as 
wi tnesses a1: •.;. : . ma11ar : 
Thomas :.- .;j^er 
M : ; j r ^ . . . ' •'•.', J-::O 
Janielle Reynolds 
> ; a ir]:i ei 
Randall Johns ton 
Haydon Cameron 
Michae] Macr i s 
Valeria Maoris 
Jim Tate 
\ J'i ] 1 :i a i i: m. C r :i si tie n 
Kathryr Duffy 
Si is... .•. - . i 
GeorgGLie KaIcuais 
John M ark 
F] DOT 
MAC RIS\SUPRES 3.INT (AN) O 
10007-06051 
A $ 
Defendant Images may call the following: 
Gleni i ri llotsc i 1 
G enev i eve To utaIne 
Elizabeth Webber 




taken in this . .-oiaced acLi-ons. 
DATED thj.£ day oir"Ja»uary, 1995. 
"DENITIS^K. POOLE — — -
ANDREA NUFFER 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
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T
 hereby cer^i:^ .....a.- -^  .. u-» and rorrec^- copy of the foregoing 
DEFENDANT IMAGE'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S THIRD SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES :i : 2. i i 1 N< > 9 ] 0 10 03 5 8 we i : • = ma i ] eel, U.S. Mail, 
postage pre-paid tc the followingi 
Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq. 
Nathan B. Wilcox, Esq. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
50 West Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt I jake City, Utah 84101 
this // 
j o n v. Harper, Esq. 
1059 First Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Uta.. 
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% . 
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CASE NO. 910400358 
DATE: JUNE 6, 1995 
-& 
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., 
a Utah corporation, and 
THOMAS MOWER, an individual, 
Defendants. 






This matter came on regularly for trial before the Court on February 16, 17, 21, 
22, 24, and 27, 1995, and March 27, 1995. The Plaintiff appeared and was represented by 
counsel Thomas R. Karrenberg, Jon V. Harper, and Nathan B. Wilcox. The Defendant and 
Third-Party Plaintiff appeared and was represented by Dennis K. Poole, Andrea Nuffer, and 
Nancy Mismash. The Third-Party Defendant appeared and was represented by Thomas R. 
Karrenberg, Jon V. Harper, and Nathan B. Wilcox. The Court thereupon heard evidence by 
the parties and witnesses in support of their respective positions, reviewed the file and 
exhibits and upon being advised in the premises now finds and concludes as follows: 
FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
1. The Plaintiff, Macris & Associates, Inc. is a Utah Corporation. 
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2. The Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, Images & Attitude, Inc. is a Utah 
Corporation with its principal place of business located in Utah County, State of Utah. 
3. Third-Party Defendant, Mike Macris is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
4. Plaintiff was a corporate distributor for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff. 
5. Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff operated a multilevel marketing business out 
of Salem, Utah at times pertinent to this matter. 
6. Multilevel marketing is promoted as an opportunity to bring other people into a 
business by " sponsoringH them and share in the profits that those people bring in by 
sponsoring other people creating what is called a "downline.M More people create a greater 
volume of sales upon which the earlier sponsors receive a percentage as compensation. 
There is an incentive to build an organization (downline) so that future income will be at a 
much greater amount because of the volume created by the organization. One incentive is to 
"sacrifice" in the beginning, working hard, while the money eventually grows through the 
duplicating efforts of "building the business." Encouragement to build "width" is usually a 
part of the contract with sponsors, requiring "break away" organizations to be built, thus 
creating "executive" levels for the original or early sponsors, so that the company will also 
continue to grow . In this action, Plaintiff was not paid very much money in the early 
months, when it worked the hardest on its distributorship. 
7. Plaintiff and Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff entered into an agreement 
which waived the normal requirements required of ordinary sponsors. Plaintiff was 
considered to have special expertise and connections that would benefit the Defendant and 
Third-Party Plaintiff, thereby justifying the waiver of certain requirements. As an incentive 
and consideration to Plaintiff to join Defendant organization and sponsor some of its 
connections, Defendant waived all qualifications under its marketing plan, pursuant to an 




objective is to develop each distributorship according to the width projects of the marketing 
plan" and "as long as the distributors are active in promoting Images and Images products." 
The language was proposed by the Defendant and was inserted on the Joanne Cameron 
addendum by Mr. Thomas Mower and inserted on the Macris & Associates and Margie 
Hunsaker addendum by Mike Macris at Mr. Mower's request. 
8. The arrangement seemed to have worked without major problems from August 
1989 through March 7, 1991. No time frame was established to meet the "ultimate 
objective," but progress was being made during the time the parties were working together. 
9. Plaintiff recruited Margie Hunsaker into Defendant and assisted her in building 
her organization in depth and width, which was contemplated in the parties contract. 
10. Plaintiff used its efforts to build the Hunsaker organization, before it developed 
its own organizational width, which was the agreement of the parties. Defendant was aware 
of this procedure by its review of the monthly reports of Plaintiff and never complained until 
1991. 
11. Plaintiff introduced an individual named Glenn Tillotson to the Defendant 
organization. Mr. Tillotson had significant experience in building a large multilevel 
marketing organization. Although Mr. Tillotson did not personally join Defendant 
organization, he assisted in building the Hunsaker organization, which benefitted Defendant. 
12. Haydon and Joanne Cameron are individuals Plaintiff recruited into Defendant. 
At the time of recruitment, Mr. Cameron had significant experience in multilevel marketing 
and in placing articles and advertisements in the national media regarding multilevel 
marketing opportunities and products. 
13. Plaintiff presented adequate and credible evidence of "actively promoting" 
Defendant's products from August 1989 until 1991, when Defendant terminated Plaintiff. 
Meetings were attended, individuals were recruited, products were promoted, training, 
motivation, and travel were accomplished by the Plaintiff. The expenditure of money was 
3 
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made by the Plaintiff to accomplish these activities. These activities were done by the 
Plaintiff to promote Defendant and Defendant's products. 
14. At all times relevant to this action Plaintiff was "active in promoting Images 
and Images' products." In addition, Plaintiff complied with the terms and conditions of its 
contract with the Defendant, which entitled Plaintiff to be paid at the highest level of 
Defendant's marketing plan. 
15. In or about February 1991, through the assistance of Plaintiff and the hard 
work of Margie Hunsaker and Glenn Tillotson, the Hunsaker distributorship became the first 
Images distributorship to achieve the Presidential level in Defendant's marketing plan of 12 
front-line qualified executives. This was Defendant's most successful distributorship during 
the period from August 1989 through August 1992, at which time Neways took over the 
multilevel operation. 
16. In an undated letter, received by the Plaintiff April 27, 1990, Defendant 
notified the Plaintiff that its autoqualification status under the addendum to distributor 
application was being terminated. This termination notice was sent at a time when the 
earnings of Plaintiff were increasing significantly (as was anticipated in the bargain) and 
Plaintiffs April 1990 check was several thousand dollars less than it should have been under 
the addendum agreement. 
17. Plaintiff immediately contacted Thomas Mower in his hotel room in California 
and complained about the termination of Plaintiffs autoqualification status under the 
addendum. Defendant ultimately withdrew the attempted termination. 
18. In the summer of 1990, several users of Defendant's nail care system began to 
experience irritation problems. Many of those users became sensitized to Defendant's nail 
gel. 
19. In an attempt to develop or locate a suitable nail gel, Mike Macris, on behalf 




gels without irritation and to determine whether other characteristics of the gels were 
appropriate. 
20. Affinity, Inc. provided gel samples to Margie Hunsaker, who had tried various 
gel samples for Affinity even before becoming an Images distributor. Affinity also provided 
samples to Ms. Reynolds, who had become sensitized to Defendant's gel. Affinity also 
provided gel samples to the Defendant to allow Defendant's personnel and distributors to try 
the samples. 
21. In a letter dated August 31, 1990, addressed to wMike Macris Affinity," 
Thomas Mower, on behalf of Defendant, noted that Affinity had provided new gels to 
distributors to test before Defendant had seen the new gels. Mr. Mower explained that he 
had not seen Affinity's new gel but had heard about it from distributors. Mr. Mower 
requested that Affinity not supply any gels to Defendant's distributors to sample unless 
Defendant was also given the gels. 
22. Following the August 31, 1990 letter, Mr. Macris, on behalf of Affinity, 
always provided Defendant with any new gel before any distributors sampled the gel. 
23. Defendant also began testing its own gels on its distributors, including Ms. 
Hunsaker and Ms. Reynolds. Ms. Hunsaker reported to Mr. Mower her impressions of any 
new gel she tried for Affinity. Mr. Mower never instructed her not to test or sample 
Affinity gels. 
24. Plaintiff never supplied gels to any Defendant distributors. 
25. In June 1990, Defendant hired Mike Macris to serve as National Sales 
Director. As part of his compensation, Mr. Macris was to receive a commission of 1/4% of 
Defendant's gross sales. 
26. Mr. Mower told Mr. Macris that while he served as National Sales Director, 
Plaintiff would be deemed to be active in promoting Defendant's products under the 
addendum, stating "its all the same." 
5 
A-16 
9 Q Q H 
27. In early August 1990, Mr. Macris voluntarily resigned from his position with 
the Defendant as National Sales Director due to disputes with Defendant over the promised 
commission and business practices of the Defendant. 
28. In response, Defendant sent Mike Macris a letter dated August 9, 1990, 
terminating him effective September 1, 1990. Defendant stated they would not pay Mr. 
Macris the commission on all sales, but would on sales in the United States. 
29. In Plaintiffs downline activity report generated in September 1990 for the 
month of August 1990, Defendant deleted the Jorita McGregor line from Plaintiffs 
downline. Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant dated October 11, 1990, complaining about the 
deletion of this distributor from the downline. Defendant returned the distributor to the 
downline. 
30. Delays in payment of checks owing to Plaintiff by the Defendant caused 
additional difficulties between the parties including involving attorney involvement 
demanding payment and delivery of monies due. 
31. On November 7, 1990 a meeting was held in Salem, Utah at Defendant's 
headquarters with Thomas Mower, the Plaintiff and Plaintiffs attorney, in part to persuade 
Defendant to release a check being held by Defendant payable to the Plaintiff. 
32. Several matters were discussed in addition to the above matter, including a 
request by Thomas Mower for a new addendum agreement with the Plaintiff. The new 
agreement called for Plaintiff to reach presidential level (12 qualified executives front-line to 
Plaintiff). Plaintiff said he would consider the proposal and Mr. Mower was to memorialize 
it in writing. The check in question was ultimately delivered at this meeting. 
33. The parties continued to have difficulties and discuss new agreements into 
January 1991. The parties were never able to come to new terms. Defendant unilaterally 
imposed a time limitation of two years from January 1991, for Plaintiff to achieve 




terminate the distributorship prior to the end of the two years for lack of requisite "activity" 
at the higher level. Plaintiff was willing to agree to a two-year term, even though no new 
consideration was offered by Defendant to plaintiff for such agreement. Plaintiff was 
unwilling to agree to the higher standard of MactiveHand termination terms being proposed. 
34. At this time Plaintiff and Defendant were unable to reach a new agreement to 
replace the addendum. Both parties were aware that the earnings of Plaintiff were going to 
increase dramatically, as had been anticipated since the inception of the original agreement. 
35. In a letter to Plaintiff dated March 7, 1991, and received by the Plaintiff on 
March 11, 1991, Defendant informed Plaintiff that it was discontinuing the autoqualification 
status of the distributorship for lack of activity. Based upon the level of activity of the 
Plaintiff, this act constituted a material breach of the contract between the parties, by the 
Defendant. 
36. Macris & Associates, Inc. fulfilled its responsibilities under the contract. 
37. Defendant ceased making payments pursuant to the contract and 
suspended/terminated the Addendum for Plaintiff, thus breaching the contract. 
38. At the time of the March 7, 1991 letter, Plaintiffs earnings were increasing 
dramatically. 
39. The Defendant warned the Plaintiff in March 1991, after already terminating the 
autoqualification status, not to supply gels to Defendant's distributors, or it may be grounds 
for terminating Plaintiff. Plaintiff never tested gels or provided gels to Defendant's 
distributors. 
40. In a letter dated March 29, 1991, after already terminating the autoqualification 
status and failing to pay Plaintiff for the month of February 1991, Defendant gave Plaintiff 
"formal" notice that it was considering termination of its distributorship. The reasons given 
were testing gels after warnings not to do so, lack of activity under the Addendum, and 
damaging activity against Defendant and its distributor force. 
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41. The three reasons given above were all without merit. 
42. After demand by Plaintiffs attorney, Defendant failed and refused to pay 
Plaintiff for the month of February 1991, or thereafter. 
43. The money not paid by the Defendant was retained by Defendant and benefitted 
the Defendant, to the detriment, injury and damage to the Plaintiff. 
44. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's wrongful and material breach 
of its contract with Plaintiff, Plaintiff has suffered damages in the amount of $9,638.96 for 
the month of February 1991, which amount the court has already entered partial summary 
judgment if favor of the Plaintiff. 
45. The amounts which should have been paid by Defendant to Plaintiff for 
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June 1992 12,692.71 
July 1992 12,103.22 
August 1992 13,263.72 
46. Defendant received the benefit of its bargain and wrongfully terminated the 
Plaintiffs Addendum. 
47. Had Defendant continued to honor the bargain, the Plaintiff would have received 
payments, based upon the formula of $360,681.20. This amount constitutes Plaintiffs 
damages as a result of Defendant's breach. 
48. The damages above are a liquidated amount and could be calculated as they 
came due. Plaintiff is entitled to pre-judgment interest in the amount of $116,087.49, as of 
February 16, 1995. After February 16, 1995, per diem prejudgment interest is $98.82 and 
interest on the judgment at the rate of 9.22% after the date judgment is entered. 
49. Following Defendant's breach of the contract, neither the Plaintiff nor Third 
Party Defendant was contractually restricted from competing with the Defendant. 
50. Third Party Defendant's activities on behalf of the new company Emily Rose 
were not done either as agent or representative for the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff never had any 
contractual relationship with Emily Rose. 
51. Neither Plaintiff nor Third Party Defendant interfered with Defendant's 
contractual relations, potential contractual relations, or existing or potential economic 
relations. Defendant has not been damaged by any acts of either the Plaintiff or the Third 
Party Defendant. 
52. Plaintiff is not the alter ego of Third Party Defendant, nor is Third Party 
Defendant the alter ego of the Plaintiff. Each maintained their separate legal personalities. 
53. The Distributor application between Plaintiff and Defendant and the addendum 




54. Plaintiff performed according to all conditions of the contract until Defendant 
wrongfully breached the contract. 
55. Defendant failed to establish that any alleged breach of contractual relations by 
Plaintiff or Third Party Defendant injured or caused damage to Defendants. 
56. Neither Plaintiff nor Third Party Defendant intentionally interfered with or 
procured any breach of any contract with any Defendant distributor or potential distributor. 
57. Neither Plaintiff nor Third Party Defendant acted maliciously, intentionally, 
recklessly, or fraudulently. Punitive damages would not be appropriate. 
58. Defendant and Third Party Plaintiffs claims against the Plaintiff and Third 
Party Defendant are without merit or legal basis and will be dismissed with prejudice. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff is directed to prepare, serve opposing counsel and submit 
appropriate findings of fact, conclusions of law and Judgment consistent with this decision. 
Dated this fc? day of June, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
BURNINSfiAM,/K0tjE 
cc: Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq.; Nathan B. Wilcox, Esq. 
Jon V. Harper, Esq. 
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This matter came on regularly for trial before the Court on February 16, 17, 21, 22, 24, 
and 27, 1995, and March 27, 1995. Plaintiff Macris & Associates, Inc. ("Plaintiff") and Third-
Party Defendant Michael Macris ("Macris") appeared and were represented by counsel Thomas 
R. Karrenberg, Jon V. Harper, and Nathan B. Wilcox. The Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff 
Images & Attitude, Inc. ("Defendant") appeared and was represented by Dennis K. Poole, 
Andrea Nuffer, and Nancy Mismash. The Court thereupon heard evidence by the parties and 
witnesses in support of their respective positions, reviewed the file and exhibits and upon being 
advised in the premises now finds and concludes as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff Macris & Associates, Inc. is a Utah corporation which has been in 
existence since November 1985. 
2. Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Images & Attitude, Inc., is a Utah 
Corporation with its principal place of business located in Utah County, State of Utah. 
3. Third-Party Defendant Macris is an individual residing in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
4. Defendant operated a multilevel marketing business out of Salem, Utah, until 
August 31, 1992, at which time Defendant ceased to operate the multilevel marketing operation 
and transferred it to Neways, Inc. 
5. Plaintiff was a corporate distributor for Defendant. 
6. Thomas E. Mower ("Mower") founded Defendant and served as its President at 
least through August 31, 1992. Mower is also President of Neways. 
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7. Multilevel marketing is promoted as an opportunity to bring other people into a 
business by "sponsoring" them and share in the profits that those people bring in by sponsoring 
other people creating what is called a "downline." More people create a greater volume of sales 
upon which the earlier sponsors receive a percentage as compensation. There is an incentive 
to build an organization (downline) so that future income will be at a much greater amount 
because of the volume created by the organization. Encouragement to build "width" is usually 
a part of the contract with sponsors, requiring "break away" organizations to be built, thus 
creating "executive" levels for the original or early sponsors, so that the company will also 
continue to grow. One incentive is to "sacrifice" in the beginning, working hard, while the 
money eventually grows through the duplicating efforts of "building the business." 
8. Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an agreement which waived the normal 
requirements for ordinary distributors. Plaintiff was considered to have special expertise and 
connections that would benefit Defendant, thereby justifying the waiver of certain requirements. 
As an incentive and consideration to Plaintiff to join Defendant's organization and sponsor some 
of Plaintiff's connections, Defendant waived all qualifications under it marketing plan, pursuant 
to an "Addendum to Distributor Application," with hand printed language noting, "Ultimate 
objective is to develop each distributorship according to the width projects of the marketing 
plan" and "as long as the distributors are active in promoting Images and Images products." The 
language was proposed by the Defendant and was inserted by Macris on the Plaintiff's 
Addendum at Mower's request, changing the wording of the second hand-printed phrase as 
follows: "As long as Distributor is active in promoting Images and Images products." 
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9. No time frame was established to meet the "ultimate objective," but progress was 
being made during the time the parties were working together. Similarly, no criteria were 
established to determine what was meant by being "active in promoting Images and Images 
products." 
10. The Distributor Application and the Addendum to Distributor Application together 
became the contract between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
11. Plaintiff recruited Margie Hunsaker Aliprandi ("Hunsaker") into Defendant and 
assisted her in building her organization in depth and width, which was contemplated in the 
parties' contract. 
12. Plaintiff and Hunsaker agreed verbally at the time they executed the Addendums 
that they would work together to build the width of the Hunsaker distributorship to the 
Presidential level of Defendant's marketing plan before building out Plaintiff's organizational 
width. Images was aware of the agreement to build out Hunsaker's distributorship first. 
Defendant was also aware that Plaintiff placed distributors under the Hunsaker distributorship 
rather than directly under its own distributorship. Defendant was aware of this procedure by 
its review of the monthly reports of Plaintiff and never complained until 1991. 
13. Plaintiff introduced Glenn Tillotson ("Tillotson") to Defendant. Tillotson had 
significant experience in building a large multilevel marketing organization. Tillotson assisted 
in building the Hunsaker organization, which benefitted Defendant. 
14. Plaintiff also recruited Hay don and Joanne Cameron (the "Camerons") into 
Defendant. Haydon Cameron had significant experience in multilevel marketing and in placing 
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articles and advertisements in the national media concerning multilevel marketing opportunities 
and products. 
15. Plaintiff presented adequate and credible evidence of its activity from August 1989 
through March 1991, in "promoting Images and Images products." The evidence shows that 
Plaintiff was active in promoting Defendant and Defendant's products by attending meetings, 
recruiting individuals, promoting Defendant's products, developing marketing strategies, training 
and motivating other distributors for Defendant, consulting with Defendant on ways to improve 
its marketing plan, and travelling for Defendant. Plaintiff expended money, including financial 
support to a down line distributor for travel expenses, to accomplish these activities. 
16. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was "active in promoting Images and 
Images products." In addition, Plaintiff complied with the terms and conditions of its contract 
with Defendant which entitled Plaintiff to be paid at the highest level of Defendant's marketing 
plan and to maintain its status as distributor for Defendant. Throughout the period from August 
1989 until March 1991, Defendant paid Plaintiff at the highest level of Defendant's marketing 
plan, according to the Addendum. 
17. In or about February 1991, through the assistance of Plaintiff and the hard work 
of Hunsaker and Tillotson, the Hunsaker distributorship became the first distributorship in 
Defendant's organization to achieve the presidential level in Defendant's marketing plan of 12 
front-line qualified executives. This was Defendant's most successful distributorship during the 




18. In spite of Plaintiffs activity level in the first half of 1990, Defendant notified 
Plaintiff in an undated letter received on April 27, 1990, that its autoqualification status under 
the Addendum to Distributor Application was being terminated. This termination notice was 
sent at a time when Plaintiffs earnings from its distributorship were increasing significantly (as 
was anticipated in the bargain) and meant that Plaintiffs April 1990 check was several thousand 
dollars less than it should have been under the Addendum. 
19. Plaintiff immediately contacted Mower in his hotel room in California and 
complained about the termination of Plaintiffs autoqualification status under the Addendum. 
Defendant ultimately withdrew the attempted termination. 
20. In the summer of 1990, several users of Defendant's nail care system began to 
experience irritation problems. Many of those users became sensitized to Defendant's nail gel. 
21. In the attempt to develop or locate a suitable nail gel, Macris, on behalf of 
Affinity, Inc. ("Affinity") — a compriy in which Macris was involved but which was separate 
and distinct from Plaintiff and had its own contractual relationship with Defendant as a supplier -
had individuals sample various gels to determine whether they could use the gels without 
irritation and to determine whether other characteristics of the gels were appropriate. 
22. Affinity, Inc. provided gel samples to Hunsaker, who had tried various gel 
samples for Affinity even before becoming a distributor for Defendant. Affinity also provided 
various gel samples to Ms. Reynolds, who had become sensitized to Defendant's gel. Affinity 
also provided gel samples to Defendant to allow Defendant's personnel and various distributors 
to try the samples. 
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23. In a letter dated August 31, 1990, addressed to "Mike Maoris Affinity," Mower, 
on behalf of Defendant, noted that Affinity had provided new gels to distributors to test before 
Defendant had seen the new gels. Mower explained that he had not seen Affinity's new gel but 
had heard about it from distributors. Mower requested that Affinity not supply any gels to 
Defendant's distributors to sample unless Defendant was also given the gels. 
24. Following the August 31, 1990 letter, Maoris, on behalf of Affinity, always 
provided Defendant with any new gel before any distributor sampled the gel. 
25. Defendant also began testing its own new gels on its distributors, including on 
Hunsaker and Ms. Reynolds - the two distributors who tried Affinity's new gels. Hunsaker 
reported to Mower her impressions of any new gel she tried for Affinity. Mower never 
instructed her not to test or sample Affinity's gels. 
26. Plaintiff never tested or otherwise provided gels to any of Defendant's 
distributors. 
27. In June 1990, Defendant hired Macris to serve as National Sales Director. As 
part of his compensation, Macris was to receive a commission of 1/4% of Defendant's gross 
sales. 
28. Mower told Macris that, because he was the principal person operating Plaintiff's 
distributorship, while he served as National Sales Director, Plaintiff would be deemed to be 




29. In early August 1990, Macris voluntarily resigned from his position with 
Defendant as National Sales Director due to disputes with Defendant over the promised 
commission and business practices of Defendant. 
30. In response, Defendant sent Macris a letter dated August 9, 1990, terminating him 
effective September 1, 1990. Defendant stated that it would not pay Macris the promised 
commission on all of its sales — only on sales in the United States. 
31. In Plaintiffs downline activity report generated in September 1990 for the month 
of August 1990, Defendant deleted the Jorita McGregor line from Plaintiff's downline. Plaintiff 
sent a letter to Defendant dated October 11, 1990, complaining about the intentional deletion of 
this distributor from the downline. Defendant returned the distributor to the downline. 
32. Delays in payment of checks owing to Plaintiff by Defendant caused additional 
difficulties between the parties including the need for attorney involvement demanding payment 
and delivery of monies due. 
33. On November 7, 1990 a meeting was held in Salem, Utah at Defendant's 
headquarters with Mower, Plaintiff and Plaintiff's attorney, in part to persuade Defendant to 
release a check being held by Defendant payable to Plaintiff. 
34. In the November 7, 1990 meeting, several matters were discussed in addition to 
the above matter, including a request by Mower for a new addendum with Plaintiff. The new 
agreement called for Plaintiff to reach the presidential level (12 qualified executives front-line 
to Plaintiff) within two years. Plaintiff indicated that it would consider the proposal, which 
8 
A-29 
Mower was to memorialize in writing. The check in question was ultimately delivered to 
Plaintiff. 
35. The parties continued to have difficulties and discussed new agreements into 
January 1991. The parties were never able to agree to new terms. Defendant insisted upon 
imposing a time limitation of two years from January 1991, for Plaintiff to achieve presidential 
status, and imposing a higher standard of "active" which would allow Defendant to terminate 
Plaintiff's distributorship prior to the end of the two years for lack of requisite activity at the 
higher level. Plaintiff was willing to agree to a two-year term, even though no new 
consideration was offered by Defendant to Plaintiff for such agreement. Plaintiff was unwilling 
to agree to the higher standard of "active" and the termination terms being proposed. 
36. At the time Plaintiff and Defendant were unable to reach a new agreement to 
replace the Addendum, both parties were aware that Plaintiffs earnings were going to increase 
dramatically, as had been anticipated since the inception of the original agreement. 
37. In a letter to Plaintiff dated March 7, 1991, and received by Plaintiff on March 
11, 1991, Defendant informed Plaintiff that it was discontinuing the autoqualification status of 
the distributorship for lack of activity. There was no mention of any other basis for Defendant's 
action in that letter. Based upon the level of activity of Plaintiff, this act constituted a material 
breach of the contract between the parties, by the Defendant. 
38. Plaintiff fulfilled its responsibilities under the contract and had been "active in 
promoting Images and Images products." 
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39. At the time of the March 7, 1991 letter, Plaintiffs earnings were increasing 
dramatically. 
40. Defendant warned Plaintiff in March 1991, after already terminating Plaintiffs 
autoqualification status, not to supply gels to Defendant's distributors, or it may be grounds for 
terminating Plaintiff. Plaintiff never tested or otherwise provided gels to Defendant's 
distributors. 
41. In a letter dated March 29, 1991, after already terminating Plaintiffs 
autoqualification status and failing to pay Plaintiff for the month of February 1991, Defendant 
gave Plaintiff "formal" notice that it was considering termination of its distributorship. The 
reasons given were testing gels after warnings not to do so, lack of activity under the 
Addendum, and damaging activity against Defendant and its distributor force. The evidence did 
not support the stated reasons for termination, all of which were without merit. Plaintiff had 
not engaged in conduct which violated Plaintiffs policies and procedures or the contract. 
42. The reasons given by Defendant for terminating Plaintiff after already terminating 
Plaintiffs autoqualification status and failing to pay Plaintiff for the month of February 1991, 
were all pretextual and without merit, and did not justify termination of Plaintiff. 
43. After demand by Plaintiffs attorney, Defendant failed and refused to pay Plaintiff 
for the month of February 1991, or thereafter. 
44. The money not paid by Defendant was retained by Defendant and benefitted 
Defendant, to the detriment, injury and damage to the Plaintiff. 
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45. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's wrongful and material breach of 
its contract with Plaintiff, Plaintiff has suffered damages in the amount of $9,638.96 for the 
month of February 1991, which amount the Court has already entered partial summary judgment 
in favor of the Plaintiff. 
46. Also as a direct and proximate result of Defendant's wrongful and material breach 
of its contract with Plaintiff, Plaintiff has suffered damages for amounts which Defendant should 
have paid to Plaintiff for subsequent months, from March 1991 through August 1992, when 
Neways took over the multilevel marketing operation. Defendant has stipulated to the following 



























March 1992 18,122.16 
April 1992 15,911.97 
May 1992 13,364.27 
June 1992 12,692.71 
July 1992 12,103.22 
August 1992 13,263.72 
47. Defendant received the benefit of its bargain and wrongfully terminated the 
Plaintiffs Addendum. 
48. Had Defendant continued to honor the bargain, Plaintiff would have received 
payments of $360,681.20 through August 31, 1992. This amount constitutes Plaintiffs damages 
through August 31, 1992 as a result of Defendant's breach. 
49. The damages above are a liquidated amount and could be calculated as they came 
due. Plaintiff is entitled to pre-Judgment interest in the amount of $116,087.49, as of February 
16, 1995. After February 16, 1995, per diem prejudgment interest is $98.82 and interest on the 
judgment at the rate of 9.22 % after the date judgment is entered. 
50. Following Defendant's breach of the contract, neither Plaintiff nor Third-Party 
Defendant Macris was contractually restricted from competing with the Defendant. 
51. There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that Plaintiff breached 
its contract with Defendant. 
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52. Macris's activities on behalf of the new company Emily Rose were not done either 
as an agent or representative for the Plaintiff. Plaintiff never had any contractual relationship 
with Emily Rose. 
53. There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that either Plaintiff or 
Macris interfered with Defendant's contractual relations or potential contractual relations, or that 
either Plaintiff or Macris interfered with Defendant's existing or potential economic relations. 
There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that Defendant was injured or damaged 
by any alleged acts of interference by either Plaintiff or Macris. 
54. There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that any contracts or 
potential contracts with Defendant were breached as a result of either Plaintiff's or Macris's 
alleged actions. 
55. There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that either Plaintiff or 
Macris engaged in any activities for the purpose of wrongfully interfering with Defendant's 
existing or potential contractual relations. 
56. There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that either Plaintiff or 
Macris intentionally interfered with Defendant's existing or potential economic relations for an 
improper purpose which predominated over any other purpose, or that either Plaintiff or Macris 
used improper means to intentionally interfere with Defendant's existing or potential economic 
relations. 
57. There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that Macris & 
Associates, Inc. is the alter ego of Michael Macris, or that Michael Macris is the alter ego of 
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Macris & Associates, Inc. There was ample evidence that adequate corporate formalities were 
met and that each maintained their separate legal personalities. 
58. There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that observance of the 
corporate distinction between Plaintiff and Macris sanctioned a fraud, promoted an injustice or 
resulted in an inequity. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The following Conclusions of Law are in addition to those Findings of Fact set forth 
hereinabove which may be properly characterized as Conclusions of Law: 
1. The Distributor Application between Plaintiff and Defendant and the Addendum 
thereto constituted a single integrated contract between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
2. Based on Plaintiffs level of activity, Plaintiff, at all times relevant, was "active 
in promoting Images and Images products." Plaintiff performed according to all conditions of 
the contract between the parties until Defendant wrongfully breached the contract. 
3. Defendant materially breached the contract between the parties when it suspended 
Plaintiffs autoqualification status for lack of activity, through its letter dated March 7, 1991. 
4. Defendant also materially breached the contract between the parties when it ceased 
paying Plaintiff under the contract between the parties. 
5. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's material breach(es), Plaintiff 
suffered damages through August 31, 1992 in the stipulated amount of $360,681.20, plus pre-
judgment interest thereon in the amount of $116,087.49 as of February 16, 1995. After 
February 16, 1995, per diem prejudgment interest is $98.82. 
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6. Plaintiff is not the alter ego of Third-Party Defendant, nor is Third-Party 
Defendant the alter ego of Plaintiff. Each maintained their separate legal personalities and the 
observance of the corporate distinction between Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant would not 
sanction a fraud, promote an injustice or result in an inequity. Therefore, Defendant's First 
Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant, based on alter ego, is without merit 
or legal basis and shall be dismissed with prejudice. 
7. Plaintiff performed according to all of the conditions of its contract with 
Defendant until Defendant wrongfully breached the contract, and Plaintiff did not materially 
breach the contract. Therefore, Defendant's Second Cause of Action, based on breach of 
contract, is without merit or legal basis and shall be dismissed with prejudice. 
8. Based on Defendant's stipulation during the trial of this matter, by and through 
their counsel, Defendant's Third Cause of Action, lased on defamation, was dismissed with 
prejudice. 
9. Defendant failed to establish that either Plaintiff of Third-Party Defendant 
intentionally induced any third party, including any of Defendant's distributors, to breach a 
contract with Defendant which, as a direct or proximate result, injured or cause damage to 
Defendant. As such, Defendant's Fourth Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party 
Defendant, based on intentional interference with contractual relations, is without merit or legal 
basis and shall be dismissed with prejudice. 
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10. Defendant failed to establish that either Plaintiff or Third-Party Defendant 
intentionally interfered with Defendant's existing or potential economic relations for an improper 
purpose or by improper means, thereby injuring or causing damage to Defendant. As such, 
Defendant's Fifth Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant, based on 
intentional interference with economic relations, is without merit or legal basis and shall be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
11. Neither Plaintiff's nor Third-Party Defendant's acts or omissions complained of 
in any of Defendant's causes of action were the result of willful or malicious or intentionally 
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and 
disregard of, the rights of others and, therefore, Defendants are not entitled to any punitive 
damages. Therefore, Defendant's Seventh Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party 
Defendant, based on pUxJtive damages, is without merit or legal basis and shall be dismissed 
with prejudice. 
12. Plaintiffs claims are not barred by (1) the statute of frauds, (2) the parol evidence 
rule, or (3) the doctrines of laches, waiver or estoppel as Defendants' claimed in the Answer to 
Second Amended Complaint. 
13. Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action against Defendant based on declaratory relief 
was dismissed with prejudice at trial. 
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14. Plaintiffs Fifth Cause of Action against Defendant based on compression of the 
Joann Cameron distributorship was dismissed with prejudice at trial on Plaintiffs motion and 
Defendant's stipulation. 
15. Plaintiffs Sixth Cause of Action against Defendant based on participation in the 
car fund program was dismissed with prejudice at trial on Defendant's motion and Plaintiffs 
stipulation. 
16. Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of Action against Defendant based on unfair trade 
practices was dismissed with prejudice by stipulation of the parties prior to trial. 
The foregoing findings and conclusions are cross-adopted to the extent a conclusion has 
been misidentified as a finding or a finding has been misidentified as a conclusion. 
DATED this day of ^^f^^^A^, 1995. 
BY THE COURTS $r*rS^iM 
Judgetjtiy Rj^urningham ..--,/ .•• 
APPROVED BY: '%. .•••'''& 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES ^"^saeel'^ 
Dennis K. Poole 
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Jon V. Harper (#1378) 
1349 Bryan Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
(801) 597-5022 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
Nathan B. Wilcox (#6685) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
(801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Macris & Associates, Inc. and Third-Party Defendant Mike Macris 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., 
a Utah corporation, and 
THOMAS MOWER, an individual, 
Defendants. 






Civil No. 910400358 
Judge Guy R. Burningham 
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This matter came on regularly for trial before the Court on February 16, 17, 21, 22, 24 
and 27, 1995 and March 27, 1995. The Plaintiff Macris & Associates, Inc. and Third-Party 
Defendant Michael Macris appeared and were represented by counsel, Thomas R. Karrenberg, 
Jon V. Harper and Nathan B. Wilcox. The Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Images & 
Attitude, Inc. appeared and was represented by Dennis K. Poole, Andrea Nuffer, and Nancy A. 
Mismash. The Court thereupon heard evidence by the parties and the witnesses in support of 
their respective positions, reviewed the file and exhibits and upon being advised in the premises, 
it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Judgment is hereby entered for Plaintiff and against Defendant in the following 
amounts: (a) $360,681.20, constituting Plaintiffs damages through August 31, 1992, as a result 
of Defendant's breach of its contract with Plaintiff; (b) $126,957.67 constituting pre-judgment 
interest on the principal amount as of June 6, 1995; and (c) per diem pre-judgment interest of 
$98.82 per day from June 6, 1995 until Judgment is entered by this Court (together representing 
the "Judgment Amount"). Following the entry of this Judgment, interest on the Judgment 
Amount shall accrue at the rate of 9.22% per annum. 
2. Defendant's First Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant, 
based on alter ego, is without merit or legal basis and is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
2 
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10. Plaintiffs Sixth Cause of Action against Defendant based on participation in the 
car fund program was dismissed with prejudice at trial on Defendant's motion and Plaintiff's 
stipulation. 
11. Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of Action against Defendant based on unfair trade 
practices was dismissed with prejudice by stipulation of the parties prior to trial. 
DATED: September _ / £ _ , 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED BY: 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES 
Dennis K. Poole 




3. Defendant's Second Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant, 
based on breach of contract, is without merit or legal basis and is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
4. Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action against Plaintiff and 
Third-Party Defendant, based on defamation, was voluntarily dismissed by Defendant and Third-
Party Plaintiff at the conclusion of Plaintiffs case at trial and is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
5. Defendant's Fourth Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant, 
based on intentional interference with contractual relations, is without merit or legal basis and 
is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
6. Defendant's Fifth Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant, 
based on intentional interference with economic relations, is without merit or legal basis and is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
7. Defendant' s Seventh Cause of A ction against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant, 
based on punitive damages, is without merit or legal basis and is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
8. Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action against Defendant based on declaratory relief 
was dismissed with prejudice at trial. 
9. Plaintiffs Fifth Cause of Action against Defendant based on compression of the 
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 JDD >can' s iigrature 
rst3-c *r»e nature ct IMAGES Internationals Program a r a cesire *o become an 
) T outer with a 't i l krowiedae ot me 'oncw ng -ac*s anc agree 'hat 
* C I 3 str butcrs arp -ot ^ua anteea any r c o n e 3~>o arp not assured of ary 
success .vill come from hare worn unc m , own individual «»rforts 
isrec ov *he sales of IMAGES products anc througn the retail success of 
» distr outers jvnom I -ecruit I will not gain any compensation *ron the simple 
ent ct other aistnoutors If I desire to recruit distributors it will be based on my 
efforts My only compensation will be through mv own retail sates and the 
on -etail sales by those of whom I have recruited under the ooiicies and pro-
of IMAGES International 
n a egaiiy Qualified resident in the state where I "eside Mv status with 
s that of an independent Contractor As such I will be responsible tor all ted-
e and ocai taxes and regulations i e the Social Secunty Act Federal Insur-
moensation Act the Federal Unemployment Ac: Federal Income Tax and Fed-
me Tax /Withholding All state taxes ano emoioyment deductions are my re-
nty and oongation It is my responsibility to make self employment and tax 
s as reauirea by iaw 
an independent Business Person I accept responsibility to seen out and find 
able aws and regulations ceraming fo mv business status and operations 
lot roic 'MAGES responsible m any * a y 'or such information cr support 
tner acknowledge to receive anc read the polices and procedures of IMAGES 
»nai ana to abide by them Also to accept them and other provisions as prom-
>y IMAGES as additions to and in replacement of this agreement or parts or 
thereof I agree to indemnify IMAGES International and hold it narmtess from 
all liability including judgements attorney fees and court costs incurred as a 
my unauthonzed representations of IMAGES products, marketing plan. 
or services 
5 m no w a / will I utilize the IMAGES name logos slogans literature or trademarks 
m any wav other than that in the ooiicies ana procedures without written consent from 
IMAGES International I 'urther agree not to make anv product and/or marketing Dian 
protections * n c n are not in accoraance with the policies ana orocedures provisions of 
IMAGES Inter iattonai I aaree at ail times to conauct mvselt in a »egai ana ethical man 
ner i will not r iane anv statements protections or claims that are misieaamg or misreo-
-esent either n e orcaucts marketing cian or tne policies ana proceaures of IMAGES 
international 
6 icree tt at %fc°re s -c* a r*»cjirf»c pjrcHasf» ether 'nan *^e sai^s kit 'o become 3" 
IMAGES ?istr b u t c i r e " I ne/er oromotp any charges or r*»cu reo o rcnases as a 
orp"»nuisite to a r /one c becoming 'he samf> Not jnaer any -irejmstances will 3 
'Ai-orrorition oe caic 4or *he r e c u tment ot anv maividuai 
"his agreement mav not be traced assigned sold or transferee without the writ 
ter oermission from IMAGES International This agreement ceases uoon aeath uniess 
thf»re is a named co-appiicant distneutor * n o will become the sole owner of distnbu-
tor s aownime Otherwise any r.gnts and benefits will be null and void I acknowledge 
that this distnbutorship agreement may be cancelled by me or IMAGES mav at «ts own 
option immediately terminate any representative who m us opinion carnages the mtec-
nty of fhe company by giving written notice to the same This agreement will be auto-
matically renewed on its anniversary date m accoraance with the *nen existing ponces 
and crocedures marketing pian and any and ail other written policies ot IMAGES Inter-
national 
3 4 this agreement is 'ermmateo within 15 days by either myself or IMAGES I have 
•he r "fit *o return ail jnooenea unused unaltered ana unaamagea oroaucts pur-
chase J that are m 'esaieaote conpit-on m accordance with IMAGES ponces ana c o -
cecums IMAGES * -e*und 1 0 0 u - of the purchase PHCP less jcnne commiss.cns 
that are jnrecoveraele or as reauiated by your state law I unaerstana that am -e-
sponsible tor alt freight postage ana snioping costs If termination of this agreement s 
after 15 days all products returned m the above state ot condition snail be suoiect to a 
2 0 S restocking and handling charge and all uoiine commission payments Distributor 
will aiso be responsible tor all treignt snipping and postage charges 
9 This agreement will be governed by the taws ot the State of Utah 
10 This agreement will not become binding on either party until accepted bv 
IMAGES international at its headQuaners in Salem Utah 
Resale Tax Number (if any) _ 
No I want the monthly accounting and downline pnntout I 
understant that S3 0 0 will automatically be deducted from my 
monthly bonus check 
No I have enclosed S2 0 0 for the yearly product liability insurance 
I E ( * / ) 
>end me IMAGES Start-up Kit I have enclosed S35 0 0 plus applicable sales 
$5 0 0 shipping and handling 
eceivea my $35 0 0 Start-up Kit from my sponsor Sponsor please initial ) 
tend me IMAGES Deluxe Success Showcase I have enclosed $ 160 0 0 plus 
>le sales tax and $ 6 0 0 shipping and handling 
•ceived my $160 0 0 Deluxe Success Showcase from my sponsor Sponsor 
utial ( ) 
I I twirl .|-.[< |.-Mc|?l 
Sponsor s Social Security Number 
Visa M/C 
Expiration Date Card Number 
Card Holder s Signature 
h Name First Middle 
Homl 




ADDENDUM TO DISTRIBUTOR APPLICATION 
1. As consideration received by Images the sufficiency of which is 
acknowledged by Images, Images agrees to waive ALL qualifications 
of applicant which are set forth in the Images marketing plan during 
the term of this agreement. Images agrees to pay distributor 
according to the Images marketing plan at the highest levels as set 
forth in the Images marketing plan including but not limited to the 
commissions, rebates, and bonuses paid at the level of ^fo^fy** and 
/Presidential for the term of this agreement. . ZV&CKS\\VM. AM* 
\) 2. Term. The term of this agreement shall commence on the date 
first written in on the distributor application and shall continue V 
through out the life of Images. As t o ^ Os D.sY^iSLT-otfi h> Actw-e 
3. An arrangement has been made between, Macris and Associates (a 
Utah Corporation), Joanne Cameron, and Margie Hunsaker who are all 
Images distributors, whereby these distributors have agreed to 
aggregate their monthly checks as earned in the form of 
Commissions, rebates and bonuses, for the term of this agreement, 
and share the aggregate amount by 1/3 each. An example of this 
would be if Macris & Associates earned a total of $150.00 in a 
calendar month and Joanne Cameron earned a total of $100.00 in a 
calendar month and Margerie Hunsaker earned $350.00 in a calendar 
month then Images would aggregate the amounts which would total 
$600.00 and then divide by 3 and pay each of the above distributors 
$200.00 which would be 1/3 each of the aggregated amount. 
Distributor hereby authorizes Images to perform herein as requested 
by distributor and as consideration given to Images for performing 
as requested herein distributor agrees to indemnify Images and hold 
it harmless from any and all liability, including judgements, 
attorneys fees and court cost incurred as a result of any losses 
Images incurs as a result of performing herein as distributor has 
requested. 
The foregoing is hereby agreed to by the parties: 
$ 
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"Undgtng Vie Cap Between Science And Human Needs. J 
E.400N. SALEM, UTAH 84653 (801) 423-2800 FAX (801) 423-2350 
August 3 1 , 1990 
Mike Macris 
A f f i n i t y 
48 tf. 300 S. #1805 N 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84101 
Dear Mike 
This is to inform you of the precarious position we are in because 
of your inability to supply the lamp housings we ordered. You have 
been prepaid $64,000 with the balance to be paid on delivery for 
12,000 units that were supposed to have r been 'delivered 
approximately 1 month ago. 
I have hired a crew that have sat idly by for 2 weeks awaiting 
housings for assembly. I must continue their employment if Z am 
to retain their services. Laying them off will put us again in 
jeopardy when the time comes to assemble lamps because of having 
to hire a new crew. Are you prepared to pay the costs for 
retaining these employees as the fault lies with you for failing 
to provide fhe lamps we ordered and prepaid? If you cannot provide 
the lamps by September 6th, please return the money advanced as Me 
will have to purchase elsewhere. 
On other matters.... We left numerous messages on your angering 
machine and don't get a response from you.' Much of it has to do 
with the afore mentioned situation. However we are continuing to 
have enormous problems associated with the use-of your Flex gel, 
nail prep and even the Ultra gel. Since* we began re-using your 
prep, the irritation rate has dramatically increased. Please stop 
passing the buck on the 10% acrylic nail being the culprits * We 
went to our formula originally because of the terrific amount of 
irritation with your gel and prep. Irritation went down with our 
prep, but so did bonding qualities. At your insistence we went 
back to your prep. Irritations have increased phenomenally since 
then. The downlines that we have so diligently developed are being 
destroyed almost as fast aa they are created* The resources of the 
company are being taxed in handling the problems created by your 
defective gels and nail prep, I believe we should talk about what 
compensation is due to Images for these situations, I wish you 
could be more available. I feel that you should be directly 
involved with some of the distributors that have initiated lawsuits 
against usj as the ultimate responsibility lies in your lap. 
I can't tell you how disillusioned I am with your performance in 
giving new gels to our distributors to test before the company has 
even seen them* This is hardly the type of R&D program I would 
expect a supplier to provide. It is also very embarrassing and 
erodes both your and our integrity with the field* At this date 
we have not yet received your latest gel and only hear about it 
from those who are using it. 
The two most Important factors we are facing besides the extreme 
medical Irritation problems aret 
1. The damage to distributors and their organizations because of 
the high failure rate of your system. Once lost these 
distributors are gone forever. 
2. Images integrity and reputation is being tarnished and 
battered. Your systems failure is hurting old and new 
distributors. We are becoming the laughing stock of the 
industry. Our once shining reputation is gone. Through 
no fault of our own. That's the sad part. Rather because 
of the "detrimental reliance" we have placed on you and 
Affinity. 
It is now very possible that Images may fail or not nearly reach 
it's potential growth because of our utilization of your system. 
Our backs are against the wall and the adversary we are facing is 
not an enemy from without or even just an aggressive competitor. 
It is internal. The integration of Affinity's {cancerous in 
nature) gel system; polluting and weakening to the point of 
destruction a once healthy, viable, radiant company. Our future 
looks very hazy and possibly quite black. To quote P060 "we have 
met the eneray, and it is us." 
All I can say is thank God the Enquirer did not run the article on 
the gel system. If it had, Images would be history by now. 
In conclusion let me advise you that we are to a point of 
desperation due to these situations. I would advise ,you to act 
quickly and appropriately. You have locked us into, a corner and 
we are rapidly bleeding to death. Presently you have the only band 
aid to stop the flow. Please respond with full solutions by the 
date mentioned or we will have to commence major surgery and cut 
out the cancer to save the situation. You seem to think the 
business of business is business and that is all, but we feel that 
business without integrity has no value. Our association* with 




cci Dale Kent/Attorney 
1200 Kennecott Blvd 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
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"Bridging Tlie Gap Between Science And Human Needs.." 
E.400N. SALEM, UTAH 84653 (801)423-2800 FAX (801)423-2350 
' 3 
March 7, 1991 
Mr. Mike Macris 
14 Quietwood Lane 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
Dear Mike: 
It has been some time since we have seen any activity on your 
distributorship. Since your agreement to become active in your 
distributorship and fulfill your part; you have not done 
anything. We have monitored your distributorship and have not 
seen even one new Distributor signed or any support to downline 
or product movement. I must, therefore, notify you that your 
auto-qualification is hereby temporarily discontinued. 
When substantial activity is demonstrated, this matter can again 
be discussei. Mike, Images has acted in good faith in our Auto-
qualification Agreement with you. We have always done our part. 
I do not feel the same in relation to your activities, in keeping 
with your part of the agreement. 
It is unfortunate that this step must be taken, but it can be 
rectified should you take the necessary action. Should you 
decide not to take the steps to boost activity on your 
distributorship, the auto-qualification will be terminated 
permanently. 










150 K. 400 N. SALEM. 1 TW1 84653 (801 • 423-1S0O F\ . \ (801) 42.<-2.<50 |<^fcJj - -
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March 14, 1991 
Mike Macris 
14 Quietwood Lane 
Sandy, at 84092 
Dear Mike: 
We have been having a considerable amount of trouble with your 
testing of gel products on our Distributors. Your gel has 'not 
been working well. We have had to spend enormous amounts of 
resources in both time and money to get it to perform. You had 
previously passed out your aesthetically appealing version. This 
has caused us a great deal of difficulty. As you know, your gel 
doesn't bond well and it yellows; but we have spent almost 
510,000 trying to correct that. Distributors are complaining to 
us that we* should have used your gel rather than our own. This 
is unbelievable. For you to have involved Distributors in your 
testing program with your unproven product has caused a backlash 
effect even against your improved version that we moditied. 
Now we find that you have talked to Teri Hill about testing a 
nail polish that you are developing for Images. Let me ask you 
in plain and simple terms to stop supplying products to our 
Distributors. I am telling you to keep out of Images' business 
and to leave our Distributors alone in this product evaluation. 
They should not be awre of what or with whom we are dealing. 
This is the last warning that I am going to give you. Do not 
violate it again or extreme action will be taken against you. 
Finally, in closing, get these defective lamp housings out of 
here immediately and get them remanufactured. I have been 
waiting for your answer. We have told you two or three times, 
written to you twice and still no response. Now, get it done or 
I will take appropriate action in this matter. 
I am ready to purchase the balance of the present order of lamp 
housings per our agreement. You may manufacture them at this 
time and we will pay the balance upon delivery and inspection. 
Make absolutely sure that they are manufactured properly and we 
do not: get one like you sent, to us in this last shipment, I an 
out of lamp housings because we need to have these corrected and 
remanufactured. I strongly suggest you get this corrected as 
soon as possible or I will be taking legal action to recover my 
loses in sales. Also, I would like to know how you intend to 
reimburse Images for: 
1) All of the costs we have had to put into modifying your 
defective gel, 
A-48 
2} The cost and labor of modifying these improperly 
manufactured housings, 
3) The Flex Gel, which we still have a lot of, which you sold 
us. We cannot use it because of the extreme danger it poses 
to the user. We want to return it and receive credit. 
4) We have had several lawsuits going against us for the use of 
this gel and, as of yet, we have not 
role as broker/manufacturer/agent for 
indicate under what entity you want 
to for handling, i.e., Macris & 
Polymer, Affinity or others. 
informed them of your 
this product. Please 
these actions referred 
Associates, American 
Please get on these matters as soon as possible. I would hope 
you can see the urgency of them. Above all, let me reiterate 
that you need to conduct your business operations and your 
Distributorship in accordance with Images' Policies and 
Procedures and stop interfering with our Distributor Force. Even 
if they are First Level to you, you may not test competitive or 
even future potential products upon these individuals. Your 




P r e s i d e n t 
March 19, 1991 
Via Telefacsimile Transmission 
Tom Mower, President 
Images International 
150 East 400 North 
Salem, Utah 84653 
Re: Letter to Mike Macris dated March 14, 1991 
Dear Tom: 
Since your letter of March 14, 1991, to Mike Macris contains 
threats of litigation, Mike has asked me to respond. 
With respect to the gel sold to you by American Polymer, the 
gel—as sold to Images—is not "defective," and you might be well-
advised to avoid disparaging American Polymer's product. Prior to 
placing an order for the gel, you indicated that Images had tested 
the gel, was aware that the gel did not contain an adhesion 
promoter, and-was pleased with the gel. You specifically indicated 
that Images would add an adhesion promoter to the gel but declined 
American Polymer's offer to evaluate the adhesion promoter for 
compatability with the gel and declined to provide American Polymer 
with a sample of the adhesion promoter for such evaluation. 
American Polymer has no responsibility for any costs Images might 
have incurred in modifying the gel to fit Images' specific desires. 
If Images is not satisfied with American Polymer's gel, or for any 
ether reason, Images may simply stop ordering the gel, just as 
American Polymer may elect to stop supplying the gel to Images. 
(In the future, I would appreciate it if you would direct any 
communication concerning American Polymer and its gel to me 
personally rather than to Mike Macris in the context of complaints 
you might have concerning Affinity (lamps) or Macris & Associates 
(Images distributorship),) 
With respect to your resurrection of the issues concerning 
the lamp housings and Flex Gel sold under the old agreement between 
Affinity and Images, I would remind you that all of the issues, 
disputes and controversies between the two companies prior to 
January 25, 1991, have been compromised and settled. A review of 
the settlement agreement dated and executed on January 25, 1991, 
might refresh your recollection on that point. Affinity simply has 
no obligation to take back any Flex Gel or lamp housings sold under 
the old agreement. Any legal action on the part of Images, as 
threatened in your letter, would be considered a breach of the 
settlement agreement and would be responded to appropriately. 
(Images can either use the heat gun to straighten any problem lamp 
housings or grind and reshoot the housings. Affinity will 
cooperate with Images in the latter option by providing its mold 
for reshooting the housings, and by obtaining a cost estimate for 
that. Please let Mike know if you would like Affinity's assistance 
on that.) 
With respect to having distributors who are closely associated 
with Mike testing gel, Mike has only provided gels to Janielle and 
Margie. If you do not want any such testing to be performed by 
current Images distributors, regardless of their close association 
with Mike, we will honor that desire. 
Finally, you have asked Affinity to manufacture and deliver 
the- lamp housings ordered under the January 25, 1991 agreement. 
Upon receipt of the March 1st payment in the amount of $19,400, 
Affinity will do so. 
Very truly yours, 
^Jon V. Harper 
A-51 
E.400N. SALEM, UTAH 84653 (801)423-2800 FAX (801)423-2350 
March 2 9 , 1991 
Mike Macris and Associates 
14 Quietwood Lane 
Sandy, Ut 84092 
Dear Mike: 
The purpose of this letter is to 
between you and Images International, 
clearly state 
which need to 
y PLAINTIFF'S |g EXHIBIT 
the matters, 
be resolved. 
As you know, Images has temporarily suspended/terminated your 
distributorship and is considering the permanent termination of 
your Distributorship. This is in process because: 
a. You have violated your agreement with Images as stated 
in our Policies and Procedures. You have involved 
Images Distributors in the testing of your products, 
even atter you were given formal written and verbal 
instruction not to do so. 
b. There has not been sufficient activity on your 
Distributorship, either through product volume or 
recruiting to warrant the continuation of your auto-
qualification of your Distributorship. You are well 
aware of our original agreement on this matter. Images 
has kept it's part of th~: bargain, you have not. 
c. Damaging activity against Images and its distributor 
force. 
We are willing, Mike, because of our past association, to allow 
you to respond to these matters. This letter then will be 
official notice to you that you have thirty (30) days from the 
date of this letter to bring these matters to resolution and 
present a proposal for doing so. It must be explicit and 
specific with commitments, goals and measurable levels to be met. 
You must never again approach any Images Distributor with the 
purpose of having the Distributor test or market your products. 
Should it come to our attention that this has happened, your 
Distributorship will be immediately cancelled. 
You may need to make a decision as to whether your 
Distributorship or other business ventures will become of primary 
importance to you. Images will need to see a significant 
increase in activity with your Distributorship, both in Product 
and Group Volume; as well as first level active distributorships 
being formed, growing and remaining actively qualified. 
If at the end of thirty days, (April 29, 1991), you have not met 
the requirements stated above to the satisfaction of the Images 
Board of Directors, your Distributorship will be terminated. 
On another matter, I feel I must restate,that we must receive the 
twelve thousand lamp housings from Affinity within the next two 
to three weeks. They must be delivered to Images in perfect 
condition; that is, free from any and all manufacturing defects. 
This is our final word on these matters, Mike. 
to perform. 
Sincere 
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